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Rehabilitation nearer for PKI suspects 
The Indonesian Constitutional Court has adopted a decision restoring the right off ormer members of 
the PK/ and associated mass organisations to be nominated as candidates in national and regional 
elections. Although the decision has come too late for implementation in elections in April this year, 
the decision is seen as a major breakthrough, rectifying nearly four decades of discrimination against 
members of the PK/. 
Ever since 1965, when the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI) was blamed for the murder on 1 October of six army 
generals, anyone suspected of being a member of the PKI or 
the many mass organisations that were associated with it 
has been subjected to political discrimination. It is now 
widely acknowledged that the 1 October 1965 Affair was an 
internal army affair. Nevertheless, a massive purge of 
alleged PKI members was launched, hundreds of thousands 
of people were thrown into prison while hundreds of thou-
sands were slaughtered in massacres that swept across the 
country from late October till March of the following year. 
Following the release in the later 1970s of all the prison-
ers, the vast majority of whom had been held without trial, 
the ex-prisoners have been subjected to a range of discrim-
inatory measures. Over the years, especially since the 
downfall of the dictator, Suharto, some of these measures 
have been repealed while other remain in force. The 
Constitutional Court's decision adopted on 25 February 
2004, brings us closer to a conclusion to this particular 
outrageous blight on Indonesian political life. 
The Constitutional Court was set up in 2003 for the 
purpose of ensuring that legislation enacted by Parliament 
is not in breach of the Indonesian Constitution which 
clearly prohibits discrimination of any kind. All decisions of 
the Court are binding and are not subject to appeal. The 
Court also based its decision on non-judicial reasons, 
namely that discrimination is no longer relevant in the 
nation's efforts to bring about reconciliation and move 
towards a more just and democratic future. 
The petitioners 
The Constitutional Court took its decision in response to 
a petition for judicial review submitted by seven men who 
were themselves victims of this discrimination: Semaun 
Utomo, Achmad Soebarto, Mulyono, Said Pradono bin 
Djaja, Ngadiso Yahya bin Sumoredjo, Tasmin bin Setyo 
Prawiro and Makmuri bin Zahzuri. A similar petition was 
submitted to the Court by a group of well-known politi-
cians, headed by Deliar Noer, formerly chairman of the 
Muslim youth organisation, the HMI which was the target 
of fierce PKI animosity prior to 1965. However this petition 
was rejected on the grounds that the petitioners were not 
themselves the injured parties. 
The Court decided to repeal Article 60 (g) of the 2003 
law on the election of members of the national parliament 
and regional legislative assemblies, prohibiting PKI 
members from being nominated as candidates. The Court 
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stipulated that this article was in breach of the Indonesian 
Constitution which prohibits discrimination based on reli-
gious beliefs, ethnicity, race, social or economic status, 
gender, language or political belief. The only persons who 
can be deprived of these rights are those suffering from 
severe ment~l disorders and those who have been convicted 
of serious crimes. 
The Court came to the conclusion that Article 60 (g) was 
inserted into the law on the basis of political considerations 
and was therefore unacceptable. Moreover, it said, prohibi-
tions may only be made on a case-by-case basis, and cannot 
be applied collectively. 
The Court based its decision among others on Law No 
39/1999 on Human Rights, and on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
Chairman of the Court Jimly Asshiddique said: 'For me, 
what is important is for this nation to go in the direction of 
the ideal of having a democratic constitution based on the 
law. Without that, Indonesia will never become a nation that 
is taken seriously by the world community. ' [Tempo, 2-8 
March, 2004] 
The chairman of Komnas HAM, the National Human 
Rights Commission, Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, said 
that, inspired by the Court's ruling, the Commission intends 
to submit an application for judicial review of all the 
remaining discriminatory legislation. The Court's ruling 
was seen as a stepping stone 'to re-examine all remaining 
legislation that is discriminative, either socially, politically, 
culturally, or in terms of economic status.' Hendardi, chair-
man of PBHI, the legal aid and human rights institute, 
welcomed the ruling 'as a first step to correcting the 
mistakes of the past.' [Tempo, 2-8 March, 2004] 
The only dissenting voice among the Constitutional 
Court's nine members was (retired) Lieutenant-General 
Achmed Rustandi, a former senior police officer. His 
dissenting opinion was echoed by General Endriartono 
Sutarto, army chief of staff, who, along with other armed 
forces officers, denounced the Court's decision, arguing that 
the PKI had been responsible for two acts of rebellion 
against the state in 1948 and 1965, and still constituted a 
threat to the state. 
By and large, the decision has been widely welcomed, 
among others by Indonesia's two largest Muslim organisa-
tions, Nahlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The decision 
has also provoked widespread discussion in the media, 
mostly positive. This indicates that the decades-long preju-
dices against the PKI are now becoming a thing of the past. 
The Court's bold decision represents an important step in 
the consolidation of democratisation in Indonesia. 
Decades of discrimination against the PKI 
Apart from the physical purge launched against alleged 
PKI members, numerous discriminatory laws and regula-
tions were adopted during the Suharto era, formalising the 
discrimination that had been in force since Suharto seized 
power in 1965. 
The starting point was a decree announced by Suharto and 
known as Supersemar which was proclaimed on 12 March 
1966 according to which the PKI was declared to be a 
prohibited organisation. Four months later, on 5 July 1966, 
the MPR, the Supreme Legislative Council, adopted Decree 
:XXV/1966 outlawing the PKI and prohibiting the dissemi-
nation of the teachings and doctrines of communism and 
Marxism-Leninism. By this time, the MPR had been 
massively purged and members of the armed forces had 
taken the place of those who had been removed. When 
Abdurrahman Wahid became president in 1999 he 
announced his intention to press for the repeal of Decree 
:XXV /1966 but this was greeted by a chorus of protests, 
forcing Gus Dur to retract. Clearly the political atmosphere 
was not yet ripe for such a move. 
Law 8/1974 on Basic Requirements for Civil Service 
Employment stated that all state employees known to have 
abused Pancasila, the state ideology, and the 1945 
Constitution or to have been involved in activities against 
the state were to be dishonourably dismissed. 
In the early eighties, after the remaining tens of thousands 
of untried prisoners had been released, a regulation was 
adopted requiring that identity cards issued to former polit-
ical prisoners should bear the initials ET (for 'former politi-
cal prisoner' or OT ('for prohibited organisation'). This 
meant that former prisoners were branded in a way that all 
institutions to which they might apply for a variety of 
requirements were informed of their stigmatised political 
status. This requirement was abolished in early 1997. 
According to the law, persons over the age of sixty are 
issued identity cards that are valid for the rest of their lives, 
but in the case of former prisoners, this special provision 
was disallowed, forcing them to apply for renewals every 
two years. Such an arrangement is very irksome because the 
issuance of identity cards requires the approval of a number 
of local authorities. 
Minister of Home Affairs Decree 32/1981 prohibited PKI 
suspects or those suspected of direct or indirect involve-
ment in the October 1965 affair from becoming members of 
the armed forces or the police, from being state officials, 
teachers, journalists, lecturers and even ministers of reli-
gion. The intention was to exclude these suspects from 
having any occupation where they might influence the 
thinking of other people. 
Presidential Decree 16/1990 stipulated that a special inves-
tigation was required for all potential state employees, 
prospective members of Parliament and regional assemblies, 
and public notaries. On 8 March, 2000, President 
Abdurrahman Wahid put a stop to these special investigations. 
However even during the post-Suharto period, discrimi-
natory measures have been adopted. Law 2211999 on Local 
Government required that no one known to have been 
involved in acts of treason against the state could be 
appointed as regional heads. 
Clause 5 of 19/2002 law on political parties stipulates that 
parties are forbidden to adopt, advocate or disseminate 
communism or Marxism-Leninism. 
This takes us to Law 12/2003 on General Elections. Article 
60 (g) of which forbade members of the PKI from being 
nominated as candidates for national and regional assem-
blies. Now that this item· of legislation has been reversed by 
the Constitutional Court, the logical follow-up is for all 
remaining discriminatory measures to be declared null and 
void. As Tempo points out, it is now up to Parliament and 
the Government to amend all remaining laws containing 
discriminatory clauses. 'Pending such decisions, all 
discriminatory measures should be suspended and no longer 
be implemented.' [Editorial in Tempo, 2-8 March 2004] 
This is the way forward so as to ensure that the rule of 
law becomes more firmly established in Indonesia. * 
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General elections: old wine in a new bottle? 
In April 2004, general elections will be held for the second time since the fall of the Suharto dictator-
ship. In the world's largest archipelago, organising elections is a complex and costly business. Three 
elections will be held, for the national and local assemblies in April, and a direct presidential election 
in July with a second round in September. A new feature is the election of a regional representative 
assembly (DPD, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) known as the Senate. 
Some political analysts say that organising free elec-
tions is the easiest part in developing a young democracy 
but this year's elections will involve many new parties 
and could produce assemblies that are very different 
from the present ones. 
While elections are an important part of the process of 
democratisation, the more difficult part is establishing the 
rule of law, properly functioning political institutions and a 
clear division of powers between the executive, the legisla-
ture and the judiciary. In countries that have emerged from 
decades of authoritarianism, the transition to democracy is 
long and tortuous and Indonesia is no exception. After more 
than 30 years of de-politicisation under Suharto, most polit-
ical parties have no distinct political programmes but have 
more to do with money politics and personalities. The tradi-
tion of having an opposition is absent and strong patron-
client relationships are the dominant feature in political life. 
Most political analysts doubt whether the elections will 
bring a fresh wind to Indonesian politics. Although 24 polit-
ical parties will participate, only three or four are expected 
to win more than ten per cent of the votes and gain a signif-
icance number of the 550 seats in Parliament. Three or four 
smaller parties are expected to get between one and five per 
cent of the votes, to occupy the remaining seats. 
The two largest parties, PDI-P and Golkar, will undoubt-
edly retain their dominant positions and most analysts 
expect them to form an alliance in the next government. 
While Indonesian opinion polls are notoriously inaccurate, 
recent polls suggest that PDI-P will lose votes while Golkar 
will keep its present position. 
Present conditions favour the big parties while the politi-
cal laws adopted since the last elections favour the older 
parties, in particular PDI-P and Golkar. 
Strong patron- client tradition 
Patron-client relations largely determine Indonesian poli-
tics with both PDI-P and Golkar being able to provide 
livelihoods for many of their supporters. At the very top, 
important business deals and government projects are chan-
nelled to party stalwarts. At the provincial, district or sub-
district level a similar system prevails, with many party 
cadres earning their keep from this trickle down system. 
In the last two years many rifts have occurred inside the two 
parties because the resources they control are too meagre to 
be divided among their supporters. Splits have occurred 
(see below) and the general conclusion is that both parties 
will lose many votes because of their worsening reputa-
tions. But as long as patron-client relations provide liveli-
hoods to many people, it is more than likely that the old 
structures will survive ideology and party political 
programmes have little relevance for the big parties. 
Golkar has abandoned its image of being the ruling party 
as it was in Suharto's New Order. However, people like 
retired General Wiranto are hoping to use it to make a polit-
ical comeback. PDI-P has emerged as a traditional national-
ist party, with die-hard nationalist ideas about preserving 
. the unity of the state. 
Tumultuous post-Suharto years 
The years following the downfall of Suharto in May 1998 
have been stormy. With three presidents, B.J.Habibie (1998-
1999), Abdurrachman Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati 
Sukamoputeri (2001 till now), political 
stability has been elusive and the country 
has been beset by regional conflicts and 
terrorist attacks. Indonesia has failed to 
shake off the impact of the economic crisis 
of 1997, leaving in its trail profound social 
and economic problems. On top of this, 
rampant corruption and elite money poli-
tics have swamped the early expectations 
of reformasi, the reform movement. 
New Party, New Paradigm ! ! New Lies, Mister!? 
Elite politicians, mostly organised in 
Golkar, have largely managed to retain 
their economic and political domination 
while civil society forces based in pres-
sure groups and NGOs have lost much 
of their bargaining position. In such 
circumstances, there has been wide-
spread frustration, despair and anger 
MERDEKA, 7 April 1999 among the population. Opinion polls 
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held September 2003 as compared with polls in 2001 
point to a decline in public expectations about satisfac-
tory government performance. 
Asked whether democracy was the best political system, 
65 per cent answered positively in 2003 as compared with 
71 per cent in 200 l . The poll was held in all 224 districts 
with the exception of Aceh. In response to the question "Do 
you think the Suharto regime was bad?" only 26 per cent 
said yes compared with 60 per cent in 2001 , while 56 per 
cent thought that the Suharto regime was better than the 
current democratic regime. The number of those in favour 
of a strongly centralised government such as existed under 
Suharto increased sharply. 
The existence of a free press has not automatically 
favoured a plural political system. As in most parts of the 
world, ownership of radio stations, TV channels and the 
print media is mostly in the hands of financial interests who 
are affiliated to the two major parties. 
Multi-party system Indonesian style 
Unlike the Anglo-Saxon tradition where two major parties 
compete for power, Indonesia has established a multi-party 
system. In Indonesia's first free parliamentary elections in 
1955, a few dozen parties took part, with four parties 
emerging as winners: two secular parties and two Muslim 
parties. From 1955 until 1999, there were no free elections. 
In the three decades of Suharto's dictatorship, elections 
were a stage-managed affair and in the early seventies the 
multi-party tradition was eliminated. Unlike most dictator-
ships Suharto constructed a unique combination of a single-
party system with two other parties as a decoration, to avoid 
giving the impression that it was a single-party system. 
The pre-1965 parties were forced to merge. Golkar became 
the ruling party, usually called the party of the ruler, as 
Suharto was the sole decision-maker while the other two 
federations, the PDI and the PPP, were irrelevant to the 
decision-making process. All the nationalist parties plus the 
small Christian parties came together in the PDI while all 
the Muslim parties merged into the PPP. Broadly speaking, 
the PDI represented the secular stream while the PPP repre-
sented the Muslim vote. 
The 1999 elections 
The multi-party system was restored for the first elections 
in the post-dictatorship period. No fewer than fifty parties, 
most of them obscure, participated in the elections which 
produced no big surprises. The short period of campaigning 
meant that the new parties failed to win support .. The three 
parties which had existed during the dictatorship, Golkar, 
the PDI-P (formerly known as the PDI) and the PPP, 
together won 65 per cent of the votes. 
With the exception of some Muslim parties, newly estab-
lished parties performed badly. PBB, PAN and PKB 
emerged as parties . with their own traditional following. 
PBB and PAN largely represent the more urban 
Muhammadiyah following while PKB represents the more 
rural following ofNahdlatul Ulama with a solid base in rural 
Java became the third largest, surpassing PPP, with 12.6 per 
cent. PPP lost its monopoly of the Muslim vote and became 
the fourth largest party with 10.7 per cent of the votes. 
Two new parties, the PK subsequently renamed PKS, and 
PKP now called the PKPI, won 1.9 and 1.4 per cent of the 
' . 
votes respectively and have seven and four seats m 
Parliament. 
The 1999 elections resulted in political shifts between 
Money politics is the name of the game 
Golkar and the PDI-P. Megawati's party the PDI, renamed 
PDI-P, became the biggest party, largely because of its 
image as prime victim of the Suharto dictatorship. 
Megawati became the symbol of resistance to Suharto's 
New Order regime and attracted many young voters. The 
PDI-P won 33.7 per cent of the votes. 
Golkar, being Suharto's party, suffered heavy losses but 
managed to maintain its stronghold outside Java. In the 
Suharto days being a civil servant was synonymous with 
being a loyal Golkar member. Although this affiliation is no 
longer obligatory, old traditions die hard. Outside Java, 
Golkar won 70 per cent support among the bureaucracy. 
About half of the provincial governors are from Golkar 
while the majority of bupatis (district chiefs) are members 
of Golkar. 
Three political streams 
The PDI-P, Golkar and the Muslim parties represent the 
three main political streams in Indonesian politics. The 
PDI-P represents the secular nationalist vote, Golkar repre-
sents the bureaucracy while an array of Muslim parties 
represent the Muslim vote. While the three streams are 
fighting each other for votes, the fact is that the elite of the 
three streams co-exist comfortably together. 
Megawati's cabinet is called kabinet gotong royong, (all-
together cabinet). It accommodates the three streams and 
rejects the existence of an opposition. This consensus exists 
even among the small radical parties like the PKS (Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Welfare Party) which had a 
seat in Wahid's cabinet. This tradition goes back to the days 
of Sukarno, Megawati's father, in the late fifties when he 
established authoritarian rule called Guided Democracy. 
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Everybody accepted this concept and forty years later, 
Megawati is following the same tradition. 
In the meantime, within the original three party feder-
ations, which represent the three streams, many tensions 
and rifts have occurred. 
The nationalist stream 
The main component of the nationalist stream is the PD I-
p led by Megawati Sukamoputeri. It emerged as the largest 
party in 1999 with 33.7 per cent of the votes and she was 
expected to become Indonesia's first president after the 
dictatorship. But the Muslim parties ganged up and 
promoted Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, as their 
candidate. However, Gus Dur was president for less than 
two years; after a campaign of political intrigue against him, 
Megawati took over as president in 2001. 
AH , .. Bf8AN HIDUP TfT~P AjA B£RAT ! 
( (, !\.,( 11 )1 
Aach ... life is tough as always ! MERDEKA, 20 April 1999 
Choose Party A Choose Party B 
It is doubtless true that anybody running a country the 
size of Indonesia, plagued by political instability and 
economic malaise, will confront many difficulties but 
things are worse than that. Megawati is not the type to push 
her weight around and adopt clear policies. The PDI-P 
which has never had a well-oiled political machine began to 
fracture in many directions. One of the main fractions is run 
by Taufik Kiemas, Megawati's husband, often referred to as 
the power behind the throne. In the last four years TK, as he 
is known, has become a key wheeler and dealer in 
Indonesian politics. But his power and influence the PDI-P 
is counter-balanced by other factions. One is led by Roy 
Janis, the powerful Jakarta boss of the party, another by 
Arifin Panigoro, an important oil tycoon, alongside the 
PDI-P bureaucracy which consists of an array of first and 
second echelon leaders. 
Endless inner-party strife within the PDI-P has resulted 
in factions leaving the ranks and setting up new parties. 
Five spin-offs from the PDI-P have managed to meet the 
conditions to contest the elections, such as having branches 
in 21 provinces. Two parties, PNI Marhaenisme and Partai 
Pelopor, are run by two of Megawati's sisters Sukmawati 
and Rachmawati. Two other parties, the PPDI and the PDIP 
are run by former party stalwarts Dimmy Haryanto and 
Sutjipto who lost out in the inner party struggles. 
The fifth party, the PNBK, is chaired by Eros Djarot, a 
charismatic politician and formerly one ofMegawati's clos-
est confidantes. The PNBK is the only party in the nation-
alist camp with a clear political programme which includes 
sosialisme Indonesia as its objective. 
It is too early to judge how these parties will perform during 
the elections but it is clear that the PNBK is the only newcomer 
with the ability to attract big crowds in public meetings and 
win over new members from the younger generation. 
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Votes for these parties will inevitably result in a decline in 
votes for the PDI-P, while many frustrated PDI-P supporters 
are likely to vote for other parties. PDI-P members are 
resigned to the fact that they will lose votes but are confi-
dent that they will have enough support to continue to be the 
largest party. 
Golkar, a strange animal 
Some analysts argue that Golkar is still the party of 
Suharto's New Order, but this is definitely not so While it 
retains many features of the ruling party under Suharto, it is 
definitely no longer Suharto's party. 
The best way to describe Golkar is that it has transformed 
itself into a pragmatic party with no ideology other than the 
retentiOn of power. Its strength is still rooted in the bureau-
cracy while is has the best party machine in the country. 
In this process, Golkar has experienced several hiccups and 
splits. The birth of Golkar goes back to the sixties 
when some army officers decided to form a polit-
ical organisation to counter the strong PKI, the 
Indonesian Communist Party. After the military 
takeover in 1965, Golkar took centre stage and 
became the dominant political force. In the course 
of the years Golkar has become a party with three 
layers: the military, the bureaucracy and an array 
of new politicians. These politicians occupy all 
the important positions in the state institutions, 
including the state-owned banks and state compa-
nies. Golkar is by definition a typical patron-client 
organisation. 
The battle over assets and hegemony in Golkar started 
immediately after the downfall of its tsar, Suharto. In the 
1999 elections several Golkar spin-off parties ran with their 
own lists, mostly headed by retired generals. One of the 
·parties, the PKPI, chaired by the former army chief of staff 
General Edi Sudradjat, managed to win several seats in 
Parliament. Others failed to reach the threshold and had to 
restructure themselves or merge with other parties. 
At least four other Golkar spin-off parties are contesting 
the 2004 elections. The Patriot Pancasila Party is the politi-
cal wing of the infamous youth organisation Pemuda 
Pancasila (PP}. The PP was initially set up to give protec-
tion to Golkar stalwarts but soon became a security mafia, 
giving protection to gambling and prostitution rackets and 
was also involved in extortion and loan shark activities . At 
the height of its power, Suharto attended its congress. In the 
post Suharto era, the PP faced a serious crisis and seems to 
be trying to reverse its fortunes by turning itself into a polit-
ical vehicle and participating in the elections. 
Another spin-off is Partai Demokrat, the political vehicle 
of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the most senior 
retired general in the Megawati cabinet. SBY has presiden-
tial ambitions but would probably be satisfied to become 
someone's running mate as prospective vice-president. 
The most spectacular Golkar spin-off is the PKPB chaired 
by a former army chief of staff General Hartono. This 
retired general is close to the Suharto family and a typical 
example of a successful soldier of the New Order era who 
combined Golkar activities with his military duties. The 
PKPB advocates a return to the good old days of the 
Suharto era and is pushing for Tutut Suharto, the former 
dictator's eldest daughter, to become president. 
Power struggle in Golkar 
While some groups decided to leave Golkar and set up 
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their own parties, the power struggle inside Golkar has 
continued unabated. The battle for the nomination of the 
presidency has been extraordinarily fierce. Two top retired 
generals Wiranto and Prabowo, who reached the peak of 
their power at the time of the fall of Suharto, are pushing 
themselves forward for the candidacy. Fat-cat businessmen 
Aburizal Bakrie and Surya Paloh are also in the race, and 
the Sultan of Yogya joined in as well. A few dark horses 
were in the wings, satisfied to become vice-president. Yusuf 
Kalla, a member of Megawati's cabinet and a prominent 
businessman from South Sulawesi, was also in the race. 
Protest against the acquittal of Golkar chair, Akbar Tandjung 
But everything changed when the Supreme Court 
announced its decision to acquit Akbar Tandjung of corrup-
tion charges. As Golkar chairman, Akbar Tandjung, is a 
typical Golkar stalwart. He gained experience at different 
levels of the party and knows the system inside out. The 
main ingredient in Golkar is a solid patron-client relation-
ship. Money politics and power is the name of the game. In 
2002 Akbar Tandjung went on trial because forty trillion 
rupiahs, owned by BULOG, the state rice distribution 
monopoly, had been siphoned off to oil the Golkar machine, 
not the first time that state institutions have been used to 
fund parties. Akbar was in charge of the cab.inet secretariat 
and was the obvious suspect. He was found guilty and 
sentenced to three years. 
He appealed against the verdict, and to no-one's surprise, 
.he was acquitted .. Despite his tarnished reputation. Akbar 
has re-emerged as Indonesia's second most important politi-
cian after Megawati. With his re-emergence in the race, all 
the other Golkar presidential contenders withdrew, with the 
exception of Wiranto. 
It is widely understood in Jakarta that Megawati would 
like to compete with a tarnished Golkar candidate rather 
than face General Wiranto. But at present, it seems that 
Akbar is holding back in a tactical move and won't put 
himself forward as presidential candidate, giving the 
impression that he would rather be the king (or queen) 
maker. But if Golkar wins more votes than the PDI-P and 
becomes the leading party, Akbar will against occupy the 
position at the very top. 
The Muslim stream 
Since the birth of the Indonesian republic Muslim poli-
tics have always been disunited. The leading social reli-
gious organisations like NU and Muhammadiyah had their 
own political outlets while smaller Muslim political groups 
created their own parties. At least a dozen Muslim parties 
took part in the 1999 elections but fewer than half won any 
parliamentary seats. PKB, the party of NU became t~e 
biggest Muslim party with 12.6 per c~nt of the vot~s. T~1s 
is the party of Gus Dur and although 1t has close ties with 
NU, it is an open party. It rejects Syariat Islam and doesn't 
favour a Muslim state. A PKB spin-off called PNUI is also 
competing in the elections. 
The other open party is PAN that won 7.1 per cent of the 
votes in 1999. This party is now openly endorsed by 
Muhammadiyah which will probably scare off some secular 
votes. Amien Rais, one of Indonesia's political heavy-
weights, will run for the presidency as chair of 
PAN. 
PPP lost votes in 1999, retaining only 10.7 per 
cent. With a weak leadership under Megawati's 
Vice-President Hamzah Haz, several splits have 
occurred over the past year. One spin-off is PB 
Reformasi which will contend with a separate list in 
the elections. 
The PBB is a modem Muslim party, moulded 
along the tradition of Masyumi, the major Muslim 
party during the fifties. It only achieved 1.9 per cent 
of the votes in 1999 and is unlikely to win much 
more in the 2004 elections. Its chair, Yusril Ihsa 
Mahendra is a colourful and controversial figure 
and has been Indonesia's Justice Minister since 
2000. 
The only party that has pulled its weight is the PKS, 
which has considerable support in many university 
campuses. In 1999 it received 1.4 per cent of the votes but 
will certainly gain votes this time round. It is inspired by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, while adjusting itself to the 
Indonesian political climate. 
Although it is a very small party, its organisation is impres-
sive and very disciplined. It was the major force behind the 
mass anti-Iraq war demonstrations in Jakarta, often mobil-
ising tens of thousands of people. The PKS is also involved 
in social activities, in particular among the urban poor. Most 
small parties like PKS consist of a mainly middle class 
membership, but the PKS has been exceptional in reaching 
out to the grass roots. It is the only party with 30 per cent 
quota for women candidates. 
In 1999, the combined vote of the secular parties (Golkar 
and PDI-P) was close to 60 per cent. The Muslim vote was 
close to 35 per cent. It is difficult to predict how the Muslim 
parties will fare in 2004 but they are unlikely to get 50 per 
cent or more. 
The 28 million young people who will be voting for the 
first time are an unpredictable factor. With improved infor-
mation through the radio, TV, the internet and newspapers, 
the traditional pattern of voting with your parents is much 
less likely. Muslim parties are likely to win a lot of support 
from these first-time voters while other votes will go to 
some of the new parties. 
New elements in the elections 
A few new parties should be mentioned. Adi Sasono an 
important Muslim politician of the nineties has set up a 
party called Partai Merdeka. He is a firm believer in an 
alternative economy at grass roots level with co-operatives 
being the strategic lynchpin against the big players in the 
globalised economy. 
Mochtar Pakpahan a prominent trade unionist who paved 
the way for independent unions during the Suharto era has 
set up a party called Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat whose 
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leaders come from his union, the SBSI and take their inspi-
ration from European trade union traditions. 
Syahrir, a well-known economist and former student 
leader from the early seventies, has established a party 
called Partai Indonesia Barn (PIB) which has attracted 
NGO activists. It has proposed a major overhaul of 
Indonesia's economic and political system. 
Another new phenomenon is the PPDK established by 
Ryaas Rasyid, who was Minister for Autonomy Affairs in 
the first years of the post-Suharto period. Autonomy is the 
main ingredient of PPDK's party programme while 
President Megawati and her PDI-P stalwarts are dead 
against far-reaching autonomy. This party is bound to 
attract voters outside Java in particular in South Sulawesi 
the home base of many of its stalwarts. 
PSI (Partai Sarikat Islam) is another new party, an alliance 
of several parties which failed to reach the electoral thresh-
old. It is a combination of a number of parties, both secular 
and Muslim. Because of this, its main political thrust is 
pragmatic, restricted to denouncing the mismanagement of 
the present government. 
The Military are running the show Jakarta Post 02.1999 
The Regional Representative Council 
Besides elections to the legislature assemblies, the elec-
torate will also vote for candidates in a new body, the DPD 
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, the Regional Representative 
Council) which will function as a kind of Senate, a rectify-
ing chamber to counter the powers of Parliament. The most 
significant thing about the DPD is that the candidates will 
not be based on the existing party system. Anybody can put 
themselves forwards as a DPD candidate as long as he or 
she has 3,000 signed up supporters. Local party branches 
can be expected to push their regional cadres forward but 
this kind of election will give the opportunity to local 
groups (peasant unions, trade unions and community 
groups) to nominate their activists as candidates. 
The military 
Analysing any important event in Indonesia must take 
account of the role of the military, the strongest political 
force in the country. However, its strategy has changed 
considerably since the New Order days. 
The military doctrine of Dwifungsi, legitimising direct 
GENERAL ELECTIONS 
military involvement in political affairs has largely been 
abandoned. TNI officers on active service have withdrawn 
from positions in legislative bodies and the bureaucracy. 
The only New Order stalwarts from the military are retired 
army officers, some of whom have gained positions in a 
number of parties. With few exceptions, most parties have 
retired officers on their boards or in their lists of candidates. 
The present batch of army officers no longer seems to 
have ambitions to become cabinet ministers, district chiefs 
or governors. Involvement in politics is handled differently 
these days, and usually implemented in direct contact with 
the President, with cabinet ministers or MPs. 
In particular the military top has devoted much energy to 
consolidating its position. The autonomy law which has 
vested power and money in the districts has given the mili-
tary a new opportunity to use their territorial structure to 
entrench themselves in local politics. 
In places of conflict like Aceh and West Papua, the mili-
tary are playing a dominant role in local affairs, pushing the 
civil administration onto the back seat. By occupying a 
dominant role in these two conflict areas, the military are 
also in a position to determine the national political agenda. 
The 2004 elections are unlikely to have much impact on 
the military's role in politics. * 
continuation from page 24 
without documents and are branded as 'illegal workers'. In 
2002, the Malaysian government ordered the deportation 
of tens of thousands of Indonesians. According to some 
sources, there are as many as 480,000 workers living 
unlawfully in Malaysia. 
In the clampdown, thousands of the workers have been 
detained in Malaysia. In late 2003, 1,200 deported 
Indonesians arrived in Belawan, North Sumatra, after 
being detained in several locations for seven months. 
NGO petition rejected by court 
Aghast at the problems confronted by Indonesian work-
ers who were forced to leave Malaysia in 2002 and were 
stranded for months in Nunukan island, East Kalimantan, 
53 NGOs filed a citizens' lawsuit against the government, 
calling on it to draw up legislation to provide Indonesian 
workers abroad with legal protection. The petitioners 
included the well-known Catholic priest, I Sandyawan 
Sumardi, human rights activist Munir from Kontras, the 
Commission for Victims of Violence, and Nursyahbani 
Katjasungkana of the Indonesian Coalition of Women. 
They accused the government of failing to provide protec-
tion for its citizens working abroad who were contributing 
huge amounts of foreign currency to the country. 
However, the petition was rejected by the Central 
Jakarta district court which argued that the government 
had not violated any regulations. A lawyer speaking for 
the petitioners said they would appeal against the ruling. 
[Jakarta Post, December, 2003] 
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ARMS SALES I 
Legal challenge to UK's arms sales policy 
A human rights activist from Aceh is challenging by judicial review the legality of the UK's policy on 
arms sales to Indonesia. Aguswandi claims that the licensing of military exports to Indonesia breaks 
UK and EU export control laws which state that licences should be ref used if there is a clear risk of 
the equipment being used for internal repression. 
The British Government under Tony Blair has continued to 
licence the sale to Indonesia of military equipment - mainly 
spare parts for jets, tanks, armoured vehicles and similar 
equipment - despite the repeated past use of such equipment 
against civilians in East Timar, Aceh, West Papua and other 
areas. 
British-made Hawk jets, Scorpion tanks and Saracen 
armoured vehicles have been used in the current war in 
Aceh in breach of Indonesian assurances that British equip-
ment will not be used for offensive or counter-insurgency 
purposes (see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 1711172, p. 24 and press 
release at http://tapol.gn.apc.org). 
Local television has shown heavy machine guns mounted 
on Scorpions firing at alleged positions of the separatist 
movement, GAM (The Guardian, 20 January 2004), despite 
claims by the British Government that there is no evidence 
of equipment being used for offensive purposes or in viola-
tion of human rights. 
TAPOL contends that the very deployment of the equip-
ment as part of a military offensive against GAM is a breach 
of the 'assurances' . 
Incorrect test used 
Under a set of policy guidelines known as the 
Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing 
Criteria, the Government is required to refuse a licence if 
there is a clear risk that the export might be used for inter-
nal repression. 
The guidelines state that special caution and vigilance 
must be exercised in issuing licences for countries where 
serious violations of human rights have been established by 
the UN, the Council of Europe or the EU. The Government 
has acknowledged, in the course of the legal proceedings, 
that Indonesia is such a country. 
Aguswandi's main complaint is that the British 
Government has indicated, by its words and actions, that it 
will refuse licences only after equipment has been misused. 
In other words, it will wait until equipment is used to violate 
human rights before it will do anything more. This is a clear 
breach of the requirement that it must refuse a licence if 
there is a clear risk that the equipment will be used for inter-
nal repression: the Government has unlawfully replaced the 
(precautionary) 'clear risk' test by a (reactive) 'evidence of 
misuse' test. 
In the legal action launched on 10 December, 
Aguswandi - who currently works as a researcher for 
TAPOL - is seeking a declaration that the continued issu-
ing of arms export licences for Indonesia is unlawful. 
The application for permission for the case to proceed to 
a full judicial review hearing will be considered by the 
High Court in London on 29 March. 
Jack Straw fails to answer key questions 
Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw has faced tough 
questioning on arms exports by a parliamentary committee 
which monitors Government policy in this area. The ques-
tions, during a hearing on 25 February, were prompted by a 
submission made to the Committee by TAPOL and 
Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT). 
The Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Exports, in its 
inquiry into the Government's annual report on strategic 
exports for 2002, asked the Foreign Secretary to explain 
why, in September 2002, the Government agreed to a relax-
ation in Indonesian Government 'assurances' concerning the 
end use of British equipment in Aceh, and why this decision 
was not announced to Parliament until ten months later. 
Before August 2002, the Indonesian Government had 
provided assurances that British-built military equipment 
would not be deployed to Aceh and that the Government 
would provide advance notification of any possible deploy-
ment. In October 2002, the Foreign Secretary wrote to the 
Committee about the deployment to Aceh of British 
armoured personnel carriers for 'casualty removal and logis-
tics'. However, it was not revealed until a parliamentary 
written answer in June 2003 that the Government had at the 
same time agreed to lift the ban on Indonesia deploying 
British-supplied equipment to Aceh and to remove the 
requirement for Indonesia to notify the UK in advance. 
The change of policy was highly significant because it 
came at a time when violence was increasing in Aceh and it 
enabled Indonesia to deploy lethal equipment to Aceh as 
part of the martial law offensive, which began in May 2003, 
without the British Government having any control over its 
end use. The Government's own annual Human Rights 
report for 2002 (which covers July 2001 to July 2002) notes 
that: 'In Aceh there was a rise in the level of violence 
following the expiry of the Humanitarian Pause in January 
2001. .. the majority of casualties have been civilians.' 
A badly-briefed Foreign Secretary, no doubt keen to stall 
for time, was unable to answer any of these embarrassing 
questions satisfactorily and had to agree to provide further 
evidence to the Committee about the reason for the change 
in policy and his failure to inform Parliament. 
The 2002 report disclosed that the Government authorised 
a massive 20-fold increase in the value of arms sales to 
Jakarta, from £2 million in 2000 to £41 million in 2002. 
The Foreign Secretary admitted in his testimony that 
licences for Hawks spares have been issued since the start 
of martial law in Aceh. * 
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Unlawful trials and prisoner abuse in Aceh 
Si~ce the declarati~n .of martial law in Aceh, there has been a phenomenal increase in the number of 
p~isoners and convictions in all parts of the region. Thousands of people have been arrested and tried 
wit~out due process. Most of the prisoners have been convicted in unlawful trials and many were 
subjected to torture and systematic abuse of their rights. It is questionable whether many are GAM 
combatants. Most are Acehnese villagers who may or may not have GAM sympathies. 
With the establishment of martial law in Aceh, the 
Indonesian Army (TNI) is in full control of virtu-
ally ~ll aspects of life. The military have used their 
special powers to arrest, detain and put on trial 
many hundreds of people. The aim is to intimidate 
activists and create an atmosphere of fear. 
A~cording to th~ martial authority in Aceh (PDMD), 
durmg the first eight months of martial law, from 19 
May 2003 till 24 January 2004, 1,623 'GAM suspects' 
were processed by the police. Of these, 1,361 were 
handed on to the attorney general. Altogether 1,096 
detainees have been interrogated while 163 detainees 
were released for lack of evidence. No fewer than 801 
people have been tried, found guilty of crimes against 
the state (makar) and sentenced to terms of imprison-
ment ranging from one to twenty years. Of all those 
convicted, only eighteen have decided to appeal 
against their sentence. 
Most of the prisoners have been convicted in unlawful 
trials held before emergency courts. According to 
Rufriadi of the Legal Aid Foundation (LBH) Aceh, almost 
80 percent of the trials did not comply with established 
legal procedures. Most of the defendants were not assisted 
by a defence lawyer. Of those who were lucky enough to 
obtain the services of a lawyer, this happened only after 
their case had been handed on to the attorney general which 
means that they underwent interrogation by the police with-
out a lawyer being presence. According to Indonesian law 
(KUHP), defendants must be accompanied by a lawyer 
during police interrogation .. 
Trials held in a great hurry 
The trials were completed in record time and in many 
cases, the verdicts were handed down after a single, brief 
court hearing. Very often the only witness called was the 
arresting police or military officer and the only evidence 
against the accused was his confession which, according 
to many accounts, was extracted by means of torture. 
Most of the judges and prosecutors were brought in from 
outside Aceh to clear the huge backlog of cases, in order 
to give the appearance that everything was being done in 
accordance with the law. 
In Pidie subdistrict for instance, Judge Nani Sukmawati 
who was sent to Pidie to lead the team of judges there, 
admitted that the judges were overworked and under enor-
mous pressure to get the trials finished in time. She herself 
passed verdicts on 72 cases in six weeks. Moreover, she 
said, during the recent Muslim Eid-al-Fitr holiday, the 
judges rushed through the cases because they were 'in a 
hurry to get home for the holidays'. 
The Legal Aid Institute in Banda Aceh has a very small 
Acehnese prisoners in shackles taken to the airport 
staff and functions under extremely difficult circumstances. 
It has therefore only been possible for them to handle a few 
dozen cases. In several of the cases, they discovered that the 
defendant had already been charged and their role was 
limited to assisting the defendant when the case was 
brou~ht to trial. According to one of their lawyers, Syarifah 
Murlma, many those who were convicted decided not to 
appeal against the verdicts for fear that the sentence could 
be increased. And in any case, the judges failed in most 
cases to advise the defendants about their right to appeal. 
According to local sources, many of the prisoners were 
beaten, kicked, punched, attacked with sticks or subjected to 
other forms of torture or ill-treatment. There were many case 
?fthe.systematic abuse of their rights as detainees. During an 
mterv1ew by AP, a teacher who was accused of aiding GAM 
bared his arms to reveal a number of scars that were from 
injuries sustained while being dragged over concrete. He told 
th: ~ou1:11alist. that several of his co-prisoners had attempted 
smc1de m their cells because of the terrible beatings to which 
they had been subjected. [AP, 7 December 2003] 
Transfer to Java 
In addition to all these injustices, hundreds of prisoners 
se?tence? to three years or more are being transferred to 
pnsons m Java. In November 2003 the head of the 
regional office of the Department of Justice and Human 
Ri~hts, T Darwin, announced that 160 prisoners were 
bemg transferred to prisons in Java, to Pekalongan, 
Amb~rawa, ~ag~lang Kedung Pane (Semarang), and the 
notonous pnson \sland of Nusakambangan. This was the 
first wave of transfers, he said. 
The authorities have come up with a number of reasons to 
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justify these unlawful transfers. The chief of the Aceh 
Police, Bachrumsyah, claimed that the transfers were 
necessary because all the prisons in Aceh were full and 
were unable to cope with these additional prisoners. But 
according to a spokesperson of the martial law authority, 
they were being transferred so that they could learn more 
about the Javanese people and their culture to counter 
GAM's denunciation of the Javanese for being colonialist. 
Another reason for the transfers, according to army offi-
cers, is to sever the prisoners' connections with their 
alleged separatist colleagues. Mingling with prisoners in 
Java would, they hope, dilute their support independence 
from Indonesia. But the treatment to which they have been 
subjected can hardly achieve such an objective. 
According to press reports, the prisoners were shackled 
to each other and upon arrival in prisons in Java, were put 
into blocs together with criminal prisoners and subjected to 
severe violence, intimidation and discrimination. 
Transfer to locations far from their homes and families is in 
flagrant breach of international standards concerning the 
treatment of prisoners. Prisoners' families have expressed 
deep concern regarding these transfers. Many were not noti-
fied about the transfers and were not allowed to see the men 
before they left Aceh. 
Torture in the prisons 
Reports about the transfers make grim reading. Muhamad. 
Nazar, who was one of the first Acehnese to be sentenced, 
was dragged out of his cell, handcuffed along with dozens 
of prisoners. They were pushed and shoved onto an army 
truck parked in front of the prison .. After a while, they were 
dragged off the truck, still handcuffed and forced back into 
their cells. Local contacts say that this was a kind of dress 
rehearsal for their transfer to Java, giving them a taste of 
the harsh treatment to come. 
Several days later, Nazar was punched repeatedly in the 
face and kicked in the chest. By the time he was sent back 
to his cell, he was in a very weak condition. More than a 
year ago, Nazar was sentenced to five years after being 
charged with rebellion. 
All the Acehnese prisoners are being subjected to discrim-
inatory treatment and have been tortured inside prison. Our 
contacts report that harsh treatment by the guards, police as 
well as military, is relentless and the prisoners are haunted 
by their terrible experiences. 
Discrimination is part of a deliberate policy. Reports 
suggest that the authorities have stirred up racial hatred 
against the Acehnese in order to alienate them from the 
other prisoners. This makes a mockery of the claim that 
one reason for their transfer to Java is to give them a 
chance to understand Javanese culture. Sowing the seeds 
of hatred towards Acehnese is not all that difficult 
because few people in Java have any sympathy for the 
Acehnese struggle and see the Acehnese as a serious 
threat to Indonesian nationalist pretensions. 
Activists arrested 
Acehnese activists continue to be the target of military 
operations. At the beginning of February. ten student 
activists from the women's organisation ORPAD and the 
Linge Student Network were arrested and detained. They 
were accused of providing sanctuary for rebels and for 
allegedly taking part in an ambush organised by the rebels. 
Following these arrests, Amnesty International issued a 
statement warning that the detainees could be subjected to 
Teuku Kamaruzzaman, one of the negotiators on trial. He 
received a 13-year sentence. 
torture and calling for their release. 
The actions against ORPAD members were also in 
response to statements made by the organisation's chair, 
Raihan Adriana who has stressed on a number of occasions 
that it is not possible to hold free and fair elections in Aceh 
while martial law remains in place. 
On 28 February, eight of the activists were released 
while the other two will be charged with treason for 
allegedly supporting separatist rebels. The two who now 
face charges of rebellion are Herlina of ORPAD, 
Acehnese Democratic Women's Organisation and lwan 
Irama Putra of the Linge Students Network. 
Campaign to halt unlawful trials in Aceh 
On 19 February, TAPOL launched a campaign to protest 
against unlawful trials and the abuse of prisoners in Aceh. 
In its Urgent Action, it urged NGOs around the world to 
protest against these outrageous abuses of justice. Groups in 
the UK were asked to take action by writing to their MPs 
urging them to call upon Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to 
protest to the Indonesian Government about the treatment 
of the prisoners and demand their release. Groups in other 
countries were asked to take similar actions. 
We urge readers to send letters along similar lines to the 
Indonesian Government at the following address: President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, President of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Istana Merdeka, Jakarta 10110. 
continuation of page i 2 
the arrest of activists was closely linked to the election in 
Aceh. ORPAD, for example, has been campaigning 
strongly against the election in Aceh. Its chairwoman, 
Raihan Adriani, gave many interviews stressing that 
democratic elections could not be held under martial law. 
On 19 February 2004, ORPAD also accused the martial 
law authority of making a deal with Partai Demokrat 
which is chaired by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the 
commander of the martial law authority in Jakarta, accord-
ing to which Acehnese who are members of Susilo's party . 
will enjoy special privileges during the elections in Aceh. 
(Kompas, 19 February 2004). * 
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Aceh Peace Conference in Kuala Lumpur 
On 13and14 December 2003 a two-day workshop, 'Contributing Towards Sustainable Peace inAceh', 
was held in Kuala Lumpur. With participants from many parts of the world, the majority of those 
present were representatives of Acehnese civil society organisations, including Acehnese in the dias-
pora, in Europe, the US and Australia. 
The Conference was jointly organised by SCHRA, the 
Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh, USIP, the 
United States Institute for Peace and Research and the 
Education Centre of the University of Sains Malaysia (USM). 
In December, peace in Aceh was at its lowest ebb, as 
Jakarta had just decided to extend martial law in Aceh for 
an unlimited period. As it would have been impossible to 
hold a meeting on Aceh in Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur was the 
most obvious venue. Six months earlier, the SCHRA 
Steering Committee had meet in Kuala Lumpur and a work-
shop on Conflict Resolution in Aceh was held in Penang, at 
the University of Sains Malaysia. 
Aceh has been an issue in Malaysian politics for decades. 
There has been a regular influx of Acehnese refugees into 
Malaysia since 1989, the start of DOM, when Aceh was a 
'military operation zone' and there have been persistent 
military operations; thousands of Acehnese were forced out 
of their villages and ended up in Malaysia. As a result, tens 
of thousands of Acehnese now live in Malaysia, most of 
whom blend well into Malaysian society. 
Aim of the conference 
The decision to hold the workshop was taken at the 
SCHRA meeting in July 2003 with the aim of broadening 
Acehnese civil society dialogue .and making it more inclu-
sive. 
The aim was twofold: to bring together as many 
Acehnese as possible, along with international colleagues, 
to share experiences of international campaigning, and for 
Acehnese to discuss and strategize about the international 
campaign on Aceh. The first day was given over to a meet-
ing of the Acehnese alone. . 
The objective of the three-day event was to contnbute 
positively to the forthcoming peace process in Aceh by 
helping elements from civil society to draw up a cl~ar 
agenda. Special attention was given t_o ensuring the p~rt1c­
ipation of Acehnese women, overcommg the past margmal-
isation of women. 
Key objectives 
The five key objectives were as follows: 
1. To create a bridge and better understanding between the 
perspective of Acehnese, and regional and international 
activists for the attainment of a sustainable peace in Aceh. 
2. To draw lessons from the collapsed peace talks. 
3. To internationalise the Acehese issue. 
4. To encourage the participation of civil society in shaping 
the peace process. 
5. To learn from the experiences of academics and others 
about peace processes in general, including learning from 
successful and failed processes elsewhere. 
Acehnese from a wide range of organisations participated 
as well as academics and members of the Indonesian 
Parliament; there were also Acehnese from Jakarta, from the 
US, Australia, Europe and Malaysia, in all a total of 25 
participants. Members from the SCHRA steering committee 
were also present,, coming from Indonesia (Jakarta and 
Yogya), Thailand, Malaysia, the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand, as well as representatives from several Indonesian 
organisations. The US, UK and Norwegian embassies were 
also represented, as well as USIP and USM (co-organisers of 
the conference) and Malaysian civil society organisations. 
Key resource persons from the international arena were 
Lord Avebury (UK) who has been involved in the Aceh 
. Peace Process since the start, Prof. Anthony Reid, National 
University of Singapore, an Aceh specialist, Dr. Lesley 
McCulloch (Researcher, Deakin University, Australia), 
Aboepriyadi Santoso (Radio Netherlands), a frequent visi-
tor to Aceh and Liem Soei Liong, SCHRA, an observer on 
Aceh affairs. Ed Mc Williams, a leading activist of the 
Indonesian Human Rights Network and former US State 
Department official was unable to attend but submitted a 
paper. 
The key persons from Indonesia were Otto 
Syamsuddin Ishak of Yappika, an Aceh specialist, 
Ghazali Abbas Adan regional representative in the 
Indonesian Parliament, and Abdul Munir Mulkan, a 
member of the central board of Muhammadiyah, Yogya. 
Others in attendance were Ayesah Abu Bakar, USM, a 
specialist on the conflict in Mindanao and Fan Yew Teng, 
a specialist on the conflict in Sri Lanka. Two key 
members of Acehnese civil society presented their views 
on the present situation: Rufriadi, Aceh Judicial 
Monitoring, on injustices and weak law enforcement and 
Juanda, representing the Acehnese Civil Society Task 
Fresh Indonesian troops in Aceh 
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Force, who spoke about social conditions under martial law. 
The three-day discussions were lively, with the Acehnese 
participants being able to speak frankly about their experi-
ences during the six months of martial law. 
24-Point Programme 
In the final session, a 24-point action programme was 
agreed. SCHRA member organizations are encouraged to 
select suitable items for their campaigning. 
1. Campaign on a European Union resolution at the UN 
Human Rights Commission in Geneva during the current 
and future years. 
2. Campaign to press the UN Secretary General to appoint 
a special assistant on Aceh. 
3. Encourage the International Committee of the Red Cross 
to monitor human rights and humanitarian conditions m 
Aceh. 
4. Encourage a broad dialogue among the Acehnese. 
5. Explore the role of the Henry Dunant Centre in Geneva, 
and possible roles for Japan and Norway. 
6. Exert pressure on the Indonesian Government with 
regard to the role of civil society: its format and modalities 
7. Push for an intermediate solution: a consultative assem-
bly in Aceh, an interim process to replace the martial law 
administration. 
8. Explore the possibilities of using the Indonesian general 
elections, for example asking candidates what their 
programme is on restoring peace in Aceh. 
9. Access for journalists and observers during the elections 
in Aceh. 
10. Examine the process of electing candidates. 
11. Demand more transparency from companies such as 
EXXON-MOBIL with regard to activities of the Indonesian 
army in the vicinity of their premises. 
12. Raise Aceh at meetings of the Consultative Group on 
Indonesia. 
13. Exert pressure for freedom of expression in particular 
for human rights defenders and local journalists. 
14. Compile reports to special rapporteurs of the UN 
Human Rights Commission in preparation for its session in 
April 2004. 
15. Assisting human rights victims to communicate with 
the UN Human Rights Commission. 
16. Campaign regarding the fate of Acehnese refugees in 
Malaysia 
17. Campaign on the cases of convicted Acehnese, Cut Nur 
Asikin, Mohammad Nazar, and the GAM negotiators. 
18. Campaign on the hundreds of legal cases in Aceh. 
19. Protection of human rights defenders. 
20. Campaign to end martial law in Aceh. 
21. Campaign to stop arms sales to Indonesia. 
22. Encourage high level missions from the EU, the 
European Parliament, UN special rapporteurs and the 
UNHCR. 
23. Facilitate the development of internal dialogue within 
civil society including Indonesians and international NGOs. 
24. Continue brainstorming to set up a think tank on Aceh. 
International pressure 
The SCHRA conference took place at a period of inten-
sifying international pressure on Jakarta regarding the Aceh 
Peace Process, including resolutions adopted by the 
European Parliament and the US Congress and the fact that 
Aceh was raised during the recent CGI meeting although 
the response from the government in Jakarta has so far been 
12 
negative. Nor has it been possible to persuade major 
Indonesian political parties to take up the Aceh issue .. The 
Indonesian elections in April 2004 and the upsurge of 
nationalism in Indonesia have played a role in keeping Aceh 
off the political agenda. 
Coalition with peace groups 
SCHRA as an international coalition of human rights 
groups has encouraged efforts in Kuala Lumpur by creating 
new openings with peace groups. The working relationship 
with USIP is one example. The absence of a peace move-
ment in Indonesia was widely felt during the conference. It 
is hoped that Indonesian participants will initiate meetings 
and seminars for the creation of a peace movement in 
Indonesia. 
SCHRA Steering Committee 
After the conference, the steering committee met to 
discuss its activities during the first half of 2004. SCHRA 
has chapters in America, Europe, Asia and Australia while a 
new chapter has been set up by the Indonesia Human Rights 
Committee in Auckland, New Zealand. 
continuation of page 14 
basic rights is an essential pre-condition for free and fair 
elections, whereas under martial law, the Achenese have 
been denied their rights to freedom of expression, associa-
tion and assembly, and the military authorities have 
imposed severe restrictions on the civilian population. 
According to Aceh Electoral Watch (AEW) in a state-
ment on 4 February, the authorities intervened to block the 
candidature of several people who were very critical of 
martial law. According to AEW, local people were forced 
to reject the candidacy of anyone who is opposed to 
martial law. (Detik Com, 4 February 2003). Ghazali Abas 
Adan, a prominent Acehnese who has repeatedly 
denounced the military approach in Aceh, was withdrawn 
as a candidate for the national parliament. 
It was also reported on 10 February that the martial law 
authorities would restrict election campaigning by parties 
in several sub-districts, including North Aceh, East Aceh, 
Bireuen, Pidie, Aceh Jaya and Aceh Barat Daya. (Kompas 
10 February 2003). 
Meanwhile, the EU has threatened not to send its election 
monitoring team to Indonesia if the Government refuses to 
allow it to enter Aceh and West Papua. In a letter written 
by Chris Patten, the EU Commissioner for External 
Relations, this was said after a stalemate had been reached 
in EU negotiations with Jakarta regarding allowing the 
team to visit Aceh and West Papua. 
Targeting activists 
Another feature of the second phase of martial law is the 
intimidation and arrest of many activists in Aceh. In 
February, several student activists from ORPAD, the 
democratic women's organisation, and the Linge Student 
Network were arrested and detained by Brimob (elite 
police force), a clear sign that the martial law authority is 
determined to remove opponents of martial law as well as 
any groups which oppose elections being held in Aceh 
under martial law. 
According to Munarman, voicing the views of the AEW, 
continued on page 10 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 175, March/April 2004 
ACEH 
Aceh seen as a threat to Indonesia's unity 
Martial law has been in force in Aceh for nine months but there are no signs that the military opera-
tions will end. The government in Jakarta has no exit strategy, which means never-ending suffering 
for the people. With the elections approaching fast, the authorities are facing the impossible task of 
holding credible free elections in this trouble spot. 
In the early days of martial law, in the middle of 2003, 
Aceh was front page news for the Indonesian press but it 
gradually slipped down, onto the back pages. In the early 
days, the country's major newspaper devoted a special page 
to events in Aceh but this too has changed. 
Never ending conflict 
According to official figures, 33,000 troops and 15,000 
police were deployed for the DOM operations but the 
thrust of the policy towards Aceh has now changed. [see 
TAPOL Bulletin 173/174, December 2003] In the early 
The Indonesian military are deliberately downplaying 
reporting and have now stopped publicising the ---
number the GAM casualties. The mood has changed 
and the feeling is growing that separatism such as is 
evident in Aceh should be dealt with firmly. 
Growing anti-separatism 
The hostility towards separatism among the general 
public has grown, which is quite a change as compared 
with the period before 1999. During the earlier mili-
tary operations which lasted almost 10 years (1989-
1998), known as the DOM period, there was public 
outcry against the gross human rights violations perpe-
trated by TNI, the Indonesian armed forces. One of the 
first steps taken by the transitional Habibie govern-
ment was to order a halt to the DOM operations. But 
much has changed in the last six years. The country 
has experienced a number of regional upheavals. 
Political instability, the result of separatism and a number 
of terrorist attacks, has reached saturation point. 
Movements like GAM and the OPM in West Papua are 
bearing the brunt of people's frustrations. TNI operations 
are now seen by more and more people in a positive light. 
Losing grip on Aceh 
When East Timor gained its independence in 1999 after a 
referendum, it was seen in Indonesia as a serious blow and 
a national humiliation, which in tum fortified anti-separatist 
sentiments. During the concluding months of the Suharto 
regime, Megawati Sukamoputeri, now the country's presi-
dent, strongly supported the integration of East Timor into 
the Indonesian Republic. Many of the country's elite politi-
cians realised that the independence aspirations of the 
Acehnese had intensified, in particular during the DOM 
period. Ministers admitted frankly that Jakarta had lost its 
authority in many parts of Aceh. Having set their minds 
against making the same mistake as in East Timor by allow-
ing a referendum, a military solution became the only way 
out of the crisis in Aceh. 
Efforts to quell separatism in Aceh are part of a growing 
sense of panic that the unity of the Indonesian Republic is 
under threat. The term NKRI, which stands for the Unitary 
State of the Republic of Indonesia, is extensively used these 
days to affirm the determination in Jakarta to prevent the 
Republic from 'losing' more territory as resistance to 
Indonesian rule grows not only in Aceh but also in West Papua. 
Raiders in Aceh, nowdays a familiar sight 
stages of the war, the main objective was to separate the 
guerrillas from the villagers. 
It is widely acknowledged that most warriors in the TNA, 
GAM's armed forces, are ordinary villagers most of whom are 
not full-time guerrillas. But occupation of the villages by the 
TNI has created logistical problems for the TNA. Most guer-
rillas are no longer able to return home to their families for 
their daily sustenance and are having to find their own food in 
the bush or the mountains. By concentrating on strongholds of 
GAM, the TNI has been able to create communication prob-
lems between TNA units. Few units have sophisticated satel-
lite phones or hand phone connections, and where such equip-
ment is available, it is often out of order. 
With the permanent presence of troops in the villages, the 
guerrillas have been forced to live permanently in the bush, 
a new hardship for most of them. In earlier days, the troops 
stayed in villages for a few days and then moved on so that 
the guerrillas were able to return home. The strategy of 
strategic hamlets, creating a division between the viUagers 
and TNA fighters, has caused new problems. The guerrillas 
know that their families are living in conditions of virtual 
captivity. It is likely that the spate of recent surrenders by 
GAM members is the result of this new strategy. 
While the TNA has its problems, the morale of Indonesian 
troops is also in decline. After nine months of constant mili-
tary operations, the TNI has failed to capture any of the eighty 
or so GAM military leaders. Hostility in the villages is wide-
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spread and although the TNA guerrillas are now avoiding 
major skirmishes, casualties in the TNI continue to mount. 
This explains why the TNI leadership was forced to dras-
tically change their strategy. Using territorial troops was 
proving ineffective, and it became clear that waging war 
against the guerrillas would need a different approach. 
Raiders, guerrilla vs guerrilla 
In December 2003, there was a massive show of force 
in Jakarta and a new unit called Raiders was put on 
display. Actually, the raiders have been recruited from 
the territorial commands and have been given special 
counter-insurgency training. After a few weeks of train-
ing, the raiders were put on show by army chief of staff, 
the hardline General Ryamizard Ryacudu. 
The raiders have been organised in platoons and broken 
down into smaller units which are despatched to the 
jungle to chase the guerrillas. For the time being, they are 
concentrating on three districts which have been identi-
fied as GAM-controlled territory. From the occasional 
reports reaching the outside world, it seems clear that 
these operations have not been successful. The TNA 
warriors, based in their own areas, are easily able to go 
into hiding and avoid clashes. In other words, military 
operation phase two has been a flop. 
The war in Aceh seems to have reached a point of no 
return. The TNI will not be able to defeat the TNA guerril-
las and the TNA has never had any illusion about being able 
to score a military victory against the TNI. In military 
terms, the war has now turned into a low intensity conflict, 
leaving the Acehnese to suffer because of their support for 
GAM. Meanwhile, the Indonesian military have shifted to 
another strategy, that of provoking horizontal conflict, with 
Acehnese fighting each other. 
Ideological war 
Retired Major General Sudradjat, one of the key officials 
at the Defence Ministry and the one in charge of designing 
strategic policies is quite frank about the war in Aceh and 
calls it an ideological war. In an interview with the Tempo 
Daily he explains the nature of the war in Aceh: 'The prob-
lems in Aceh cannot be resolved in a quick way. The battle 
that occurs is of ideological nature. There is a philosophy 
behind it. Our experience how to overcome DI/TI! [The 
movement in the fifties that fought for a Islam State, 
TAPOL ed.] can be used as a lesson, i.e. we were not able 
to solve it quickly. [Tempo, 7 March 2004] 
Major General Sudradjat explains that applying the hearts 
and minds strategy not only means the extermination of 
GAM but this should go hand in hand with the physical 
rehabilitation of the villages and improvement of the human 
resources of the Acehnese. In theory, Sudradjat's words 
sound impressive but in practice it needs professional 
soldiers that are able to apply this strategy. 
The average TNI soldier is poorly trained and of low 
morale. It is doubtful that TNI can apply a successful 
hearts and minds strategy in Aceh. TNI's hearts and minds 
strategy in East Timor was a complete failure and only rein-
forced the resistance. The easier way is to recruit Acehnese 
to fight the Acehnese, the same method earlier applied in 
East Timor with devastating effects. 
Militias in Aceh 
The seeds for a civil war are being sown in Aceh. During 
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the second phase of martial law, the martial law authority 
and the local government adopted a policy of setting up 
'civilian defence groups', the name by which militias are 
officially known. These groups are being set up throughout 
Aceh to combat GAM but local activists fear that this will 
fuel a bloody conflict between Acehnese. 
There have been militia gangs in Aceh since the start of the 
conflict, a policy that was also pursued in East Timor at the 
height of the resistance to the Indonesian occupation. 
However, the militia groups in Aceh are not well organised 
and there has been scant support for them because of the 
deep-rooted hostility of the Acehnese towards Jakarta. 
Before martial law was declared and during the period when 
Aceh was a 'military operation zone' (DOM), the number of 
militias was very small and they were confined to just a few 
areas, mainly Central Aceh, South Aceh and East Aceh. 
But since the imposition of martial law in May 2003, more 
militia groups have been established. The task of persuading 
Acehnese to become militias has been given to the civilian 
authorities. The governor of Aceh, Abdullah Puteh, has held 
many public rallies in an attempt to encouraged people to 
sign up. Anyone who refuses to become a militia is branded 
as being anti Indonesia and can face serious consequences. 
Given the pressure that has been exerted on the popula-
tion, groups of militias have been set up in almost every 
sub-district. The names they bear are intensely ideological 
such as Gerakan Pemuda Merah Putih (Red-and-White 
Youth Movement), and Front Anti GAM (Anti GAM Front). 
The creation of militias in Aceh is nothing less than a 
tactic to provoke conflict among the Acehnese. However, 
the policy of relying on recruiting militias is also a sign that 
the present military operation is not working. The policy 
was adopted after the military realised that they enjoyed 
very little support for their operations among the Acehnese. 
The commander of the martial law authority in Aceh, 
Endang Suwarya, frankly admitted at the end of the first 
period of the martial law that there was very little support 
from the locals for the operation. 
In the second phase of martial law, more civilians have 
been forced to join up. According to reports from local 
sources, people have been ordered to hunt down GAM 
members. In some cases, civilians are ordered stand in the 
frontline when skirmishes occur so as to protect soldiers 
from being killed by GAM. 
Most operations are now focussed in remote areas and 
villages while conditions in the towns appear to be normal. 
However, this is not the case in those urban areas where 
undisclosed military operations are underway. One tactic is to 
alienate Acehnese whose family members are involved in 
GAM. Their houses are marked with red crosses as a warning 
to others and a way of turning their neighbours against them. 
The election in Aceh 
Despite objections in many circles about the plan to held 
elections in Aceh in April, the Indonesian Government have 
said that they intend to go ahead with the plan. It is impos-
sible for free and fair elections to take place under condi-
tions of martial law. 
MM Billah of the National Human Rights Commission, 
Komnas HAM, has acknowledged that an election in Aceh 
under martial law cannot be democratic. According to him, 
the government should lift martial law before the election is 
held [Republika, 17 December, 2003). The restoration of 
continued on page IO 
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Listening to the voice of the victims 
While scores of books have been published in Indonesia or overseas about the events of 1 October 
1965, they almost all focus heavily on what is officially known as the G-30-S and largely ignore the 
purge that followed in its wake, still less base their analysis on the experiences of the hundreds of thou-
sands of victims. An important new book has now appeared which focuses on understanding the expe-
riences of the victims. 
The new book, Tahun Yang Tak Pernah Berakhir, 
Memahami Pengalaman Korban 65, (The Never-Ending 
Year, Understanding the Experiences of the 65 Victims), is 
published by one of Indonesia's foremost human rights 
organisations, ELSAM, in collaboration with the 
Volunteers' Team for Humanitarianism and the Indonesian 
Social History Institute. 
The book consists of six essays based on oral history, 
dealing with the arrests and killings in Central Java, a 
long wait in the face of many obstacles, on women who 
became political prisoners, on remaining firm in a time 
of madness, on forced labour and development (the pris-
oners contribution to the Suharto regime), and on the 
armed PKI rebellion in South Blitar. 
The editors explain in their Introduction: 
Linking social memory with monuments, museums, cere-
monies and books is done in such a way as to remind people 
of the 30 September Movement while forgetting what 
happened afterwards. The murder of seven army officers 
takes pride of place over the mass arrests and killings as the 
nation's major tragedy. Everything is done to focus on a 
relatively small incident while the horrifying catastrophe 
which resulted in mass slaughter is simply passed over. All 
the public consciousness and sympathy that still remains is 
engulfed by the portrayal of the PKI as a mighty, inhuman 
monster. The state wants people to regard the 'PKI' as being 
so evil that it is perfectly reasonable for it to have been 
treated in this way. People are encouraged not to think 
about human beings but only about the 'PKI' as an abstract 
category (page 12). 
The editors draw attention to the fact that after most of the 
prisoners were released during the course of the 1970s, 
identity cards issued to former prisoners bore special initials 
identifying their political status. A regulation issued by the 
Minister of Home Affairs in 1981 stated that they were also 
prohibited from working in occupations that could influ-
ence public opinion. Moreover, it was feared that they 
might use such positions to spread communism. What is 
more likely, say the editors, is that the government feared 
that they might talk about the crimes perpetrated by the 
military in 1965-66. 
The social memory about 1965-66 has been formed ·. by 
state propaganda and the silencing of the voice of the 
victims. 'We cannot go on allowing the voice of the victims 
to be ignored,' say the editors. 
Discovering family secrets 
A number of volunteers were recruited to interview a 
total of 260 people consisting of former political prisoners 
and their families as well as the families of people who were 
killed in the 1965-66 massacres. But some people did not 
want to be 
interviewed 
out of a 
sense of fear. 

















Ruslan Wijayasastra, a PKI life-prisoner in Cipinang 
Prison. This picture was taken in 1993 and smuggled 
oul He eventually died in prison. 
The editors draw attention to the attitude of the volunteer 
interviewers, most of whom were from the younger genera-
tion. When they first met and spoke to victims of the terror, 
they became very angry because what they heard seemed to 
reflect on their own communities, even on members of their 
own families. Some of the volunteers managed to uncover 
family secrets in the course of their work. One volunteer 
returned to his native village in East Java and asked his 
grandmother to tell him what happened in 1965. For the 
first time ever, she told him about her husband, his grandfa-
ther, who was a member of the peasants' organisation, the 
BTI, and who disappeared at the end of 1965. To this day, 
she doesn't know what happened to him. She has kept silent 
for all these years, hoping against hope that he might return 
home one day. Another volunteer knew that his uncle had 
been a political prisoner but had never heard him say 
anything about what happened. Another volunteer only 
found out, during the course of his interviews, that many of 
his relatives were killed in 1965-66. Other members of the 
family had never spoken about what happened to them. 
(Page 20) 
One of the six essays consists of the stories of victims' 
families collected by Yayan Wiludiharto. The writer 
explained in the preface to his essay that when he was a boy, 
he believed that PKI people Were not like ordinary people, 
that they were very terrifying. Every year at school, the 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 175, March/April 2004 15 
I 
HUMAN RIGHTS I 
I 
children had to watch a propaganda film called The G-30-
S/PKI Treachery. 'All our sympathies went to the families of 
the sadistically tortured and murdered generals. We felt that 
the "PK.I members" deserved to be exterminated .... because 
they had committed horrific crimes. When our teachers 
were angry with mischievous children, they would accuse 
them of being PK.I.' 
After the events of 27 July 1996, he began to think more 
seriously about history. Occasionally, he would go out on 
the street with friends to sell books that were banned by the 
New Order government. One book that he read at the time 
was Surviving Indonesia's Gulag by Carmel Budiardjo. 'I 
was shocked to read about the terrible things that happened 
to political prisoners. I could not believe that such terrible 
things had happened in my country.' 
'I first came face to face with some victims of the 1965 
Tragedy at the end of 2000. I thought that it would be easy 
to get them to tell their stories but this was not so. Having 
been closely supervised for decades not only by govern-
ment officials but also by their own communities , they 
were very wary about meeting new people. When they 
started coming up with frank answers about their personal 
experiences, all the bitterness of their lives came out. ... 
Things didn't always go smoothly, especially with people 
who had hidden their stories to protect their families, in 
particular their children.' 
He recalled the continual New Order propaganda about 
the need to nurture 'prosperous' families, about birth control 
and about healthy living in the countryside. 'But what about 
the hundreds of thousands of families who were regarded as 
being PKI? The government stole their dreams, set families 
against each other and foreclosed all opportunities for them 
to live peaceful and happy lives.' (Page 63) 
Prisoners used for forced labour 
Any history book in Indonesia will devote special atten-
tion to the way in which Indonesians were used as forced 
labour during the Japanese occupation from 1942-1945 
known as Romusha, and the forced labour system inflicted 
on the Javanese in the nineteenth century during the Dutch 
colonial era, while there is total silence about the way in 
which political prisoners were extensively used as forced 
labour after 1965. 
In an essay, Romusha and Development, the Contribution 
of Political Prisoners to the Suharto Regime, Razif 
describes how people who were accused of being commu-
nists or their sympathisers were forced to work without any 
remuneration: 
'Under the Suharto regime, forced labour was used in 
many regions, from Sumatra to the island of Buru. In 
Lampung (South Sumatra) for instance, political prisoners 
were forcibly used in (what became known as) 'kopel' River 
(kopel is the Dutch word for a soldier's belt) to dig up sand. 
Anyone who worked too slowly would suffer blows from 
the guards' belts. In Ciandjur, West Java, prisoner labour 
was used to build the Siliwangi Monument which is now 
the pride of the local community. (Siliwangi was the name 
of the West Java military command.) The prisoners were 
used to keep the cities clean throughout the province of East 
Java and they even built the Trisula Operation Monument in 
South Blitar. (The Trisula Operation crushed a PKI uprising 
in South Blitar, in 1968.) Almost all the buildings in Palu 
(Sulawesi) city and its outskirts were constructed by pris-
oner labour. The majority were freed from this forced 
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labour only after President Suharto was deposed in 1998. 
'Prisoners who were incarcerated in Sukamiskin Prison, 
Bandung were forced, after being released in 1992, to take 
part in forced labour. The Cirandjang village head ordered 
fourteen former prisoners to clean the Cirandjang Road up 
to the Rajamanda Bridge, a distance of 15 kilometres, as 
their routine work. Once every fortnight, they had to pull up 
the grass along the road, and they also had to clean the 
Cirandjang chiefs office. Not only did they build roads, 
bridges and monuments, but they also worked as house 
boys in the homes of army officers. This would include 
washing clothes, cleaning and repairing the houses and 
making household equipment. In additon, their labour was 
used to build mosques and churches.' (Page 140) 
The essay also goes into detail about the way prisoners 
who were banished to the island of Buru in 1969 had to 
work hard on a number of projects. The island was covered 
by thick jungle which had to be cleared by the prisoners, 
before building their own barracks. Much of the timber 
which they produced was taken by their guards who sent it 
away from the island and sold it. In the early months, they 
had to work with their bare hands as no digging equipment 
was available. The prisoners were also extremely short of 
food, malnourishment was rife and many succumbed to a 
variety of illnesses. (Pages 14 7-152) * 
Tahun yang Tak Pernah Berakhir 
Memahami Pcngalaman Korban 65 
ORDERS to: 
ELSAM email: elsam@nusa.or.id 
website: www.elsam.or.id 
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Press fre·edom under threat 
Indonesia's most power/ ul business tycoon, To my Winata, is using his unlimited influence to under-
mine the freedom of the press, the most crucial element in the country's reform programme, to protect 
himself against exposures about his business interests. A leading publication, Tempo, was targeted by 
libel suits and acts of violence, while journalists from other publications have been convicted on spuri-
ous charges. The protections provided under the 1999 Press Law have been ignored, while defamation 
articles in the Criminal Code are being used to browbeat the press. 
Winata's wrath was aroused by an article published by 
Tempo in March 2003 which argued that he stood to bene-
fit from a fire that engulfed more than 5,500 kiosks in the 
Tanah Abang textile market in Central Jakarta. The article 
was entitled 'Ada Tomy di Tenabang' (Is Tomy in Tanah 
Abang?) and described the tycoon, whose business interests 
are primarily in banking and real estate, as a 'scavenger 
extraordinaire'. 
He is widely known to have ties with the underworld and 
the military, frequently hiring thugs to press home his 
message and is generous with bribes for officials . 
[Laksamana Net, 25 February 2004] The Tempo report also 
devoted several paragraphs to Winata's denial of any 
involvement, but he nevertheless accused the publication of 
'damaging his good name' . 
On 8 March last year, around one hundred thugs led by a 
trusty of the tycoon named David Tjioe attacked Tempo's 
editorial office, injuring two employees. Laksamana Net 
reported that some of the thugs were members of a gang 
called 'Indonesian Young Bulls' (BMI), a paramilitary 
organisation affiliated to the PDI-P which is led by 
Megawati Sukarnoputri. Police stood by while the attack 
proceeded. 
There are strong indications that the police were in fact 
colluding with the tycoon. Koran Tempo [Laksamana Net, 
25 February 2004] reports that a senior police officer 
contacted Winata to 'request permission' to arrest his men. 
Winata claims that he told the officer 'to disperse the rally' . 
No such thing happened of course. Shortly after the inci-
dent, AJI, the Alliance of Independent Journalists, sought to 
press for charges to be brought against the police for failing 
in their duty to protect the public. 
The claim for huge damages for alleged libel was widely 
denounced by media workers as a threat to press freedom 
and a move to intimidate the press. Pressing home the point, 
Goenawan Mohamad, one of the country's foremost jour-
nalists and commentators, called on media workers to stand 
together against this assault. 'We must unite and resist any 
attempts to limit press freedom, otherwise this hard-earned 
liberty will be put at risk .... If one journalist is imprisoned, 
others will follow.' [Jakarta Post, 16 October 2003). 
The court even ordered the seizure of Goenawan 
Mohamad's residence as a way of securing assets should 
Winata win the case and damages would have to be paid. 
Commentators have noted that there has been no court 
orders for the seizure of assets in corruption cases currently 
under consideration. 
The libel suit against Tempo was based on the much 
reviled defamation article incorporated some years 
ago into Indonesia's Criminal Code. This has led to 
renewed calls for the so-called "hate article', a hang-
over from Dutch colonial times, to be repealed. 
Winata's libel case simply ignored the Press Law of 
1999, enacted as one of several reforms in the wake of 
the downfall of the Suharto dictatorship, which 
provides safeguards for the press and points to the 
need for people who are dissatisfied with allegations 
against them to use their right of reply. 
In the Suharto era, the authorities clamped down hard 
on the press and banned a number of publications, 
including Tempo. Such actions are no longer in favour 
but the present government has made it known that 
offending journalists and their publications will face 
prosecution under the Criminal Code if they publish 
libellous reports. Media workers decry the fact that in 
the post-Suharto era, the Criminal Code is being 
wheeled out to· punish so-called 'misdeeds' which is 
making a mockery of press freedom, regarded as the 
key reform in the much vaunted programme of 
democratisation. 
Press under strong pressure 
Press freedom flourished in Indonesia as never before 
in the aftermath of Suharto's fall in 1998. The ultimate 
victory was the abolition of the Minister of Information, a 
post in the cabinet that functioned for decades as a censor 
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supremo over the press. Most frequently, a senior armed 
forces offcier was appointed as the minister and nicknamed 
by the student oppostion the 'minister for propaganda and 
censorship. During the 18 months of Wahid's term as 
President, this post was abolished, a clear sign to the outside 
world that the days of censorship were over. 
From 1998 until 2001 the Indonesian press enjoyed a kind 
of 'Prague spring', a liberal period and was regarded by 
many as the most liberal press in Southeast _Asia But this 
liberal period had its dark side as many media conglomer-
ates emerged: commercial TV, radio, magazines and dailies 
run and owned by tycoons close to the political establish-
ment. Reporting in the press is dominated by major events 
in Jakarta, while major local events are largely ignored. 
As soon as Megawati took over the presidency in 2001, 
the post was restored but given a new name_, Mini~ter of 
Communication and Information. Although his role is less 
heavy-handed than in the Suharto era, the decision made it 
clear that the present administration wants to have greater 
state control over the press. 
Many laws have been revoked or amended in the post-
Suharto period, including the press law. These changes hav_e 
removed the most glaring anti-democratic features of previ-
ous laws while ensuring that the grip of the political estab-
lishment remains firm. 
Some positive developments in press freedom in recent 
years have been reversed, putting the ~ed~a under the 
control of Parliament (DPR). The maJonty of DPR 
members are from the two major parties PDI-P and Golkar, 
representing the political establishment. It bas~c~lly means 
that the Indonesian press now faces more restnct1ons. 
AJI, the journalists' union has justifiably questioned the 
need for a press law to regulate the press. As they say, the 
bottom line is that press freedom will be curbed and regu-
lated by power politics in Parliament. 
The role of the Press Council 
The post-Suharto era also produced a ne_w body call~d the 
Press Council, replacing the other bodies that basically 
functioned as censorship bodies. The Press Council was set 
up to safeguard the good quality of ~he press and .also to 
mediate in all cases involving the media. The Council func-
tions as an independent body and consist of respected 
former journalists and academics. 
In the present wave of legal disputes which h~ve ~een 
Tempo and Rakyat Merdeka being charged for hbel m a 
criminal court, the Press Council tried to play a role as 
mediator, settling the disputes outside the courts. 
The PPM (Pemuda Panca Marga) case, for example, 
reflects the difficulties of a free press. The PPM, a notori-
ous youth group, was infuriated because Tempo published . 
an article about how PPM members attacked the Kontras 
office on 27 May 2003. Tempo was accused of publishing a 
libelous statement and describing PPM as a 'gang' that used 
violent methods. Initially PPM agreed to enter into a deal 
with the weekly but unexpectedly filed a lawsuit on 22 
December. 
The organisation has used the court to demand _h~ge 
compensation from Tempo, no less than Rp250 billion 
(US29.76 million). The judges rejected the request of 
Tempo 's Defence Team that the Press Council shoul? act 
as mediators and appointed a member of the National 
Mediation Centre to mediator under the supervision of 
the Supreme Court. [Jakarta Post, 27 Feb. 2004] 
A recent proposal presented to Parliament suggests that 
the Press Council should be placed under the supervisi~:m of 
the legislature and would play a more pro-active role, mter-
fering and giving 'guidance' to the pr~ss . Ichl~sul Amal, the 
chairman of the Press Council, has rejected this proposal _as 
it would tum the Council into a kind of 'police force' with 
powers to control the press. 
Tempo wins a partial victory 
In February 2004, the Central Jakarta District , Court 
rejected the lawsuit against Tempo on the grounds of a lack 
of defendants'. It accepted the journal's argument that the 
lawsuit should have been filed not only against Tempo but 
also against detik.com, the website which carried the ~a~e 
story. Winata's lawyer later claimed th.at ~he court dec_1s10n 
did not mean that Tempo had been vmd1cated and hinted 
that her client may appeal against the verdict. 
In June 2003, Tempo's sister publication, Koran Tempo 
[Tempo Newspaper} quoted Goenawan Mohamad. as 
saying: 'This country should not be controlled b{' orgamsed 
crime or by Tomy Winanta.' The article als.o cited. allega-
tions that Winata was linked to illegal gamblmg. This led to 
another libel lawsuit which resulted in a record libel judge-
ment against the publication on 20 January ?004, ordering 
it to pay US$1 million to Winata and to publish an apol~gy 
in a number of national newspapers on three consecutive 
days. Failure to comply will incur a fine of Rp 10 millio~ 
($1,190).Koran Tempo's chief editor, Bambang Harymurti 
said that they would appeal against the verdict. 
Other journalists penalised . . 
In another lawsuit, the South Jakarta Distnct court handed 
down a six-month suspended sentence against Supratman, 
the executive editor of a popular tabloid, Rakyat Merdeka 
and a five-month suspended sentence on Karim Paputungan 
for publishing articles deemed to be insulting to President 
Megawati Soekamoputri and Akbar Tanjung, the speaker of 
Parliament. 
According to Jakarta Post [27 January 2004], altogether 
ten libel lawsuits have been brought against the Tempo 
group, six of which were brought by Tomy Winata. 
274 cases against the press 
The National Human Rights Commission has meanwhile 
announced the findings of a team set up to monitor press 
freedom in Indonesia since the 1990s. It recorded that there 
had been 274 cases of violence against the press from 1996 
up to the end of 2003. A spokesman for the team, Anshari 
Thayib, said that 144 cases involved physical threats, 110 
cases involved intimidation of journalists, while there was 
one case of sexual harassment. The cases including the 
unsolved murder ofFuad Udin Muhamad, a journalist from 
the Yogyakarta-based Bernas daily on 13 August 1996. The 
case was initially heard by the Yogyakarta District Court but 
dropped, to avoid implicating a senior local official. 
Anshari said that his team would initiate investigations into 
this case in view of the availability of new evidence impli-
cating state officials, including Sri Roso Sudarmo, the then 
regent of Bantul in Central Java. It was because of this 
man's involvement that the case was dropped in 1996. The 
new evidence includes testimony from the murdered man's 
colleagues. [Jakarta Post, 1 August 2003] 
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Yale finds evidence of genocide in West Papua 
Two recent events have highlighted the prolonged suffering of the West Papuan people and the urgent 
need for international action. In December, Yale University Law School published a damning report 
which finds strong evidence of genocide in West Papua, and in February, Nobel Peace Laureate, 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu responded to the 'brutal oppression' of the West Papuan people by urging 
the UN to review its role in Indonesia's annexation of the territory. 
Genocide is the 'quintessential human rights crime'. It is 
'the ultimate denial of the right to existence of entire groups 
of human beings' and as such it is not a term to be used 
lightly, say the Yale researchers. 
Notwithstanding that caution, they conclude that the 
historical and contemporary evidence strongly suggests 
that the Indonesian Government has committed genocide 
in West Papua. 
The report by the prestigious university, entitled 
Indonesian Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: 
Application of the Law of Genocide to the History of 
Indonesian Control (1 ), finds that the West Papuan people 
have suffered persistent abuses and that the Indonesian 
security forces have engaged in widespread violence, extra-
judicial killings, torture, rape and sexual violence since the 
Act of 'Free' Choice in 1969. 
It goes on to say that these acts, taken together with prac-
tices which have led to pervasive environmental harm, the 
undermining of traditional subsistence methods, and wide-
spread disease, malnutrition and death, 'appear to constitute 
conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction 
of the West Papuans'. Many of these acts, it argues, consti-
tute crimes against humanity under international law. 
It concludes that: 'Although no single act or set of acts can 
be said to have constituted genocide, per se ... there can be 
little doubt that the Indonesian government has engaged in 
a systematic pattern of acts that has resulted in harm to - and 
indeed the destruction of - a substantial part of the indige-
nous population of West Papua.' 
On the difficult issue of whether the Government had the 
intention to commit genocide required under international 
law, the report says that 'such a pattern of ... acts and omis-
sions supports the conclusion that the government has acted 
with the necessary intent to find that it has perpetrated 
genocide against the people of West Papua'. 
The report highlights the urgent need for heightened inter-
national attention to the grave human rights situation in 
West Papua. A press release issued by the Law School 
draws attention to ongoing 'violence, civil unrest, and griev-
ous abuses of human rights and points out that without 
significant international pressure, 'the pattern of violent 
repression in West Papua is likely to continue'. 
State Dept: no improvement in rights 
The fact that the human rights situation in West Papua 
remains in crisis is confirmed by the US State Department's 
Annual Human Rights Country Report for Indonesia for 
2003 (2). Its general conclusion is that the Government's 
human rights record remained poor in 2003 and that it 
continued to commit serious abuses. Security force members 
'murdered, tortured, raped, beat and arbitrarily detained civil-
ians and members of separatist movements,' it says. 
On West Papua, it states that there was 'no improvement' 
in the human rights situation and the Government made 
little progress in establishing accountability for numerous 
human rights violations committed in previous years. The 
most serious violations, it notes, took place in the Central 
Highlands where there were extrajudicial killings, numer-
ous acts of torture and politically motivated arson. 
Rights abusers move in 
Fears that the Indonesian military (TNI) is involved in a 
systematic attempt to destabilise West Papua and create 
unrest were reinforc·ed in December by the appointment of 
Indonesia's former East Timor police chief, Timbul Silaen, 








Demonstration in Jakarta demanding justice for human rights 
violations in West Papua 
of notorious East Timor militia leader, Eurico Guterres, in a 
new West Papua militia group. 
The day after Silaen's appointment was announced on 1 
December, it was revealed that Guterres planned to set up a 
b~anch of his militia group known as FPMP (Front Pembela 
Merah Putih - Red and White Defenders Front) in the 
mining town of Timika and was actively recruiting 
members for the group. 
Both Silaen and Guterres have been implicated in serious 
crimes committed at the time of East Timor's 1999 vote for 
independence when systematic and gross violations of human 
rights were perpetrated against the country's civilian popula-
tion by the Indonesian military and their militia proxies. 
Guterres, leader of the Aitarak militia group, was convicted 
of crimes against humanity by Jakarta's ad hoc human rights 
court on East Timor in November 2002. He was given a 
minimal sentence of ten years imprisonment, but is free 
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pending an appeal, which could take many years. 
Silaen, East Timor's police chief in 1999, was acquitted by 
the ad hoc court - which has been widely criticised for being 
deeply flawed and failing to provide justice for the victims 
of violence in East Timor - but along with Guterres, he has 
been indicted on crimes against humanity charges by East 
Timor's Serious Crimes Unit (3). 
TAPOL and other· members of the international solidarity 
movement for West Papua have previously warned that the 
failure of Indonesia's ad hoc trial process would undermine 
efforts to end impunity and result in increased violence and 
oppression in areas such as West Papua and Aceh (4). 
TAPOL is calling for Silaen's appointment to be rescinded 
and for both men to be transferred to East Timor to face trial. 
Army ordered Freeport killings 
Further evidence of the military's destabilising role has 
emerged with a report that US officials believe local army 
commanders ordered an ambush that killed an Indonesian 
and two American teachers near the Freeport copper-and-
gold mine in Timika in August 2002. 
Military involvement in the attack on a convoy of buses 
carrying teachers and children from Freeport's international 
school has long been suspected by the local police and 
human rights groups, but joint investigations by the police 
and US FBI officials have faced persistent obstructions and 
cover-ups by the army (5). The US State Department coun-
try report described a joint police and army investigation as 
'ineffectual' due to a lack of co-operation by the TNI. 
Raiders, a new army unit especially created to 
eradicate separatism. 
Fallowing a fifth visit to West Papua by FBI agents at the 
beginning of March, a senior US official was quoted by 
Associated Press as saying: 'It's no longer a question of who 
did it. It's only a question of how high this went within the 
chain of command.' (6) Previous reports have suggested that 
the ambush was discussed in advance at the highest level of 
the army. However, the US Embassy in Jakarta issued a 
statement denying the Associated Press report, stating that 
the investigation was ongoing and that the FBI had reached 
no conclusion regarding any party's guilt or innocence. 
The murder of the two American citizens remains a stum-
bling block to the resumption of full military relations 
between the US and Indonesia. The Bush Administration is 
trying to normalise relations, suspended in the wake of the 
army's devastation of East Timor in 1999, but in January, 
Congress restored a ban on International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) until the State Department determines 
that the TNI and the Indonesian Government are co-operat-
ing with the FBI's investigation into the Freeport killings. 
The Congressional measure continues the ban on foreign 
military financing of weapons sales and licenses for the 
export of lethal military equipment to Indonesia (7). 
Despite the fact that some of the worst human rights viola-
tions in Indonesia are committed by the military in the vicin-
ity of major enterprises, such as the Freeport mine, the 
Government has recently announced that it will continue to 
use the military to provide security at 'vital projects' in a bid 
to attract new foreign investment. In a 'multilayered security 
system', the police and military will provide a 'third ring' of 
protection behind internal security guards and local residents 
(8). This will apply to Freeport, but it is not yet clear if it will 
apply to BP's Tangguh gas project [see separate item]. 
It was recently revealed that the TNI has dropped plans to 
withdraw a 550-strong task force from the Freeport mining 
area. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, armed 
forces commander, Endriartono Sutarto announced in 
November that he was seeking government approval for the 
troop withdrawal, because he no longer wanted the army to 
be perceived as a mercenary force in the pay of foreign 
companies, but the plan was changed at the urging of army's 
hardline chief of staff, Gen, Ryamizard Ryacudu (9). 
Independence supporters targeted 
A key component of the military's destabilisation strat-
egy appears to be the renewed targeting of peaceful polit-
ical activists and the use of repressive legislation to limit 
freedom of expression. 
In a provocative move in December, 16 political prison-
ers, who had been under 'town arrest' in the highland town 
of Wamena, were detained and 12 were transferred to 
Abepura prison in Jayapura, hundreds of kilometres from 
their homes. The prisoners were all convicted in relation to 
incidents in Wamena in October 2000 in trials which were 
widely condemned as unfair (10). Four of the prisoners -
Rev. Obeth Komba, Amelia Yiggibalom (who remains in 
Wamena prison), Rev. Yuda Meage, and Murjono Murib -
are local Panel members of the pro-independence Papua 
Presidium Council and are considered to be prisoners of 
conscience by Amnesty International. Those taken to 
Jayapura were not allowed to inform their families and 
lawyers at the time of their transfer, a violation of interna-
tional standards concerning the treatment of prisoners. 
TAPOL is calling for the immediate and unconditional 
release of all the prisoners. 
Seven Amnesty prisoners of conscience are currently 
facing trial in the town of Manokwari. They were arrested 
during a peaceful flag-raising ceremony on 27 November 
and have been charged with rebellion. Four students who 
. ' 
were detamed for nearly two months after releasing flags 
attached to balloons in the Central Java town of Semarang 
were released without charge on 1 February. ' 
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In January, three men were sentenced to life imprisonment 
and four others were jailed for 20 years for their alleged 
roles in an attack on an ammunition dump in Wamena in 
April 2004. The incident led to a military crackdown in 
which at least 16 people died from exposure, starvation or 
at the hands of the military (11). 
The National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas 
HAM) has established a Commission of Inquiry (KPP 
HAM) to investigate allegations of grave violations of 
human rights committed by the military following the 
Wamena raid and similar allegations of human rights viola-
tions by the notorious Police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) in 
the Wasior area in 2001 (12). There are, however, doubts as 
to whether the Inquiry will receive the full support of the 
authorities and whether its findings will be followed up. A 
similar inquiry which found evidence of gross violations of 
human rights in relation to police attacks on students in 
Abepura in December 2000 has not yet resulted in trials of 
the alleged perpetrators (13). 
Meanwhile the circumstances behind the assassination of 
independence leader, Theys Eluay, in November 2001 
remain unresolved (14). West Papuan tribal leaders meet-
ing in February have rejected what they called an unsatis-
factory investigation into the killing and asked for UN help 
in setting up an independent inquiry (15). 
Archbishop Tutu calls on UN to act 
Responding to the West Papuans' desperate 'cry for 
justice', South Africa's Nobel Peace Laureate, Desmond 
Tutu, has joined growing international calls for UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to instigate a review of the 
UN's role in Indonesia's take-over of West Papua. 
In a statement issued in February, he said the people of West 
Papua 'continue to suffer brutal oppression' where their 
fundamental dignity as human beings and their basic human 
rights, including the right to self-determination are being 
denied. 
In calling for a review of the UN's conduct he said a 
strong UN will be capable of acknowledging and correcting 
its mistakes. An international campaign to persuade the 
Secretary-General to review the UN's conduct in relation to 
the 1969 Act of 'Free' Choice was launched in March 2002 
(16). It is attracting growing support including a majority of 
members of the Irish Parliament. 
WEST PAPUA 
STATEMENT BY ARCHBISHOP DESMOND TUTU, 
SOUTH AFRICA 
For many years the people of South Africa suffered under 
the yoke of oppression and apartheid. Many people 
continue to suffer brutal oppression, where their fundamen-
tal dignity as human beings is denied. One such people is 
the people of West Papua. 
The people of West Papua have been denied their basic 
human rights, including their right to self-determination. Their 
cry for justice and freedom has fallen largely on deaf ears. 
An estimated 100,000 people have died in West Papua 
since Indonesia took control of the territory in 1963 . 
It is with deep concern I have learned about the United 
Nations' role in the take-over of West Papua by Indonesia, 
and in the now-discredited "Act of 'Free' Choice" of 1969. 
Instead of a proper referendum, where every adult male and 
female had the opportunity to vote by secret ballot on 
whether or not they wished to be part okkkf Indonesia, just 
over 1,000 people were hand-picked and coerced into 
declaring for Indonesia in public in a climate of fear and 
repression. 
The UN had just 16 observers to this Act for a country 
the size of Spain. The then Secretary-General's 
Representative reported on the conduct of the Act to the 
UN General Assembly in 1969, which noted his report on 
19 November of that year. 
One of the senior UN officials at the time, Chakravarthy 
Narasimhan, has since called the process a "whitewash". 
A strong United Nations will be capable of, among other 
things, acknowledging and correcting its mistakes. 
I would like to add my voice to growing international 
calls for the UN Secretary General to instigate a review 
of the UN's conduct in relation to the now-discredited 
"Act of 'Free' Choice" . 
I will keep the people of West Papua in my prayers, and I 
would like to extend my best wishes and moral support to 
them in their hour of need. 
February 23, 2004 
No end to three-way split crisis 
There is no end in sight to the political and security crisis 
caused by the Government's controversial attempt to split 
West Papua into three provinces. Suspicion that this policy 
was initiated by the TNI was strengthened by reports that 
the military have established an eight kilometre-wide 
'border' between the newly formed West Irian Jaya and the 
rest of West Papua (17). This border area is rich in timber 
resources. Similar 'border' areas are reportedly planned for 
the new province of Central Irian Jaya. They would be 
under TNI control and would offer lucrative opportunities 
for natural resource exploitation. At a seminar in Jakarta in 
February, a former Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, 
Sabam Siagian, questioned the interests of the National 
Intelligence Agency (BIN) and the TNI whom he believed 
·. to be behind the decision to split the territory. 
The seminar, featuring leading West Papuan experts, 
Indonesian official and religious leaders, called on the 
Government to lift Presidential Instruction 1/2003 on the 
three-way split and enforce Law 2112001 on special auton-
omy (18). Although special autonomy falls far short of the 
self-determination wanted by the overwhelming majority of 
West Papuans, some are prepared to accept it as a step 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 175, March/April 2004 21 
WEST PAPUA 
towards that objective. 
The seminar also called for the establishment of an inde-
pendent special team to bridge the widening distrust 
between Jakarta and West Papua. This echoes calls by 
Papuan civil society for the Government to enter into peace-
ful dialogue with West Papuan representatives mediated by 
a third neutral party. 
Former Papua governor, Barnabas Suebu said at the semi-
nar that 'Papuans no longer had confidence in the central 
government since Jakarta appeared to have no real solution to 
prolonged and perceived injustices' . He warned that the situ-
ation would become worse, especially during the forthcoming 
elections, and Papua would suffer the same fate as Aceh if 
Jakarta continued to treat Papuans as objects in its policies. 
? 
2003, at tapol.gn.apc.org/pr030626.htm 
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accuses police in Papua', 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 162, p. 18. Indonesia's Constitutional Court is currently examining 
the constitutional validity of the 1999 law which originally 
created two additional provinces for West Papua (19). 
Troops on increased alert for elections 
The forthcoming national elections are bound to be a time 
of heightened tension and possible violence in West Papua. 
Whether or not the situation deteriorates, it is clear that the 
current conditions of military repression will not permit free 
and fair elections. Furthermore the banning of West Papuan 
national parties means that the vast ma'jority of the popula-
tion who support independence will be denied a democratic 
outlet for their aspirations. 
Two thirds of the Papuan police force of 9,000 officers 
will be deployed to guard the elections, and will be backed 
up by 2,000 military personnel. The commander of the 
local Trikora military command has said that troops will 






(3)See TAPOL press release, 4 December 2003, at 
tapol.gn.apc.org/pr031204.htm 
(4)See West Papua Association-UK, press release, 26 June 
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173/174, p. 12, and reports in previous TAPOL Bulletins. 
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Murder', Jakarta Post, 28 February 2004. 
(16) See 'West Papua campaign launched at UN', TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 166/167 and further information at : 
http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/unreview 
(17) See The Papua Report, February 2004, RFK Memorial 
Center for Human Rights, Indonesia Support Group. 
(18) See 'Experts seek to Dispel Trust Between Government 
and Papua', Jakarta Post, 18 February 2004. 
(19) 'Papuans Awaiting Court's Verdict on Division of the 
Province', Jakarta Post, 13 January 2004. 
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Tangguh: increased TNI and police presence 
The construction of British Petroleum's $2 billion Tangguh natural gas project in Bintuni Bay looks 
set to begin in 2004. With contracts to supply gas to the US, the Philippines, South Korea and China, 
the final investment decision will be taken later this year. Whilst the project will secure massive prof-
its for BP, its impact on West Papua includes increased militarisation with its associated risk of human 
rights abuses and the potential for internal conflict. West Papuan human rights advocates demand the 
'right to say no' to multinational corporations. 
In June 2003, the BP-funded Tangguh Independent 
Advisory Panel, TIAP, paid its second visit to the site of 
BP's planned liquefied natural gas mega-project. Its find-
ings provided the input for its Second Annual Report on 
Tangguh, published in November 2003. Set up and funded 
by BP, TIAP gives external advice to the company regard-
ing 'non-commercial aspects' of the project. [TIAP second 
annual report on Tangguh, p. l] Chaired by US Senator 
George Mitchell, and including Lord David Hannay of 
Chiswick, TIAP's independence has been questioned. As 
well as being funded by BP, one of the four-man panel, 
Sabam Siagian, sits on the board of Kaltim Prima, the giant 
coal mine co-owned by BP. Nevertheless, the TIAP report 
raises some important questions about Tangguh. 
'Important to the prestige of Indonesia' 
President Megawati inaugurated Tangguh in December 
2002, referring to it as a 'national project' and thereby high-
lighting the political importance of Tangguh for Jakarta. 
But, by not declaring it a 'vital project', she left a degree of 
uncertainty over what role the military will play in 'protect-
ing' Tangguh. The police chief of operations, Colonel Max 
D. Aer, told the TIAP team of the importance ofTangguh 'to 
the prestige of Indonesia' stressing that security was a top 
priority. [TIAP report, 2003, p 17.] 
Clearly, the prestigious nature of Tangguh for Jakarta 
cannot be separated from Jakarta's assertion of control 
over West Papua, primarily through an increased military 
presence. 
Last June, TAPOL warned that Tangguh was likely to act 
as a catalyst for militarisation in West Papua. [TAPOL 
Bulletin 171/2, 2003.] Troop numbers in West Papua have 
more than doubled over the past year, increasing from an 
estimated 4,350 in 2002 to around ten thousand in 2003. 
An additional 2,000 troops was announced in August 2003, 
following protests against the decision to split West Papua 
into three separate provinces. 
New Brimob presence in Bintuni 
TIAP notes that 'Police expenditures will increase as a 
result of the need to provide security in the new Bintuni 
district'. Part of these additional expenses will be for a unit 
of Brimob, the notorious mobile police brigade. Although 
part of the police, not the military, Brimob have been linked 
to numerous cases of human rights abuses in West Papua 
and across Indonesia. An additional Brimob presence will 
increase the risk of human rights abuses in the area. 
Backtracking on TNI role? 
TIAP's second annual report rightly considered the 
security provision as 'one of the most sensitive issues for 
the Project'. Developments in the year between TIAP's 
two annual reports indicate the high level of sensitivity 
and the intractable problem of the security forces' rela-
tionship to the project. 
Yet, TIAP's latest report and, most significantly, BP's 
response to it, indicate a change in attitude towards the 
security forces, pointing to the increased likelihood that 
they will play a significant role 'protecting' Tangguh. 
In their first annual report, TIAP recommended that BP 
'resist demands by the TNI or the police for direct funding' 
to which BP expressed its agreement. [See BP response to 
TIAP report, 2002, p9.] A year later, TIAP says: 'It is plain 
that both the police and TNI will have a role in Tangguh 
security', and that, in relation to increased police expendi-
ture, 'BP must face the reality of providing some appropri-
ate support for those increased costs'. TIAP's second report 
goes much further in this direction and considers the stan-
dards which should be applied to 'specific support for the 
police' and 'any support provided to the TNI'. In their writ-
ten response to TIAP, BP failed to rule out such scenarios, 
effectively leaving the door open for the company to fund 
the police and the military. 
No right to say 'no' 
Addressing the University of Columbia's Centre for the 
Study of Human Rights in October last year, leading 
West Papuan human rights advocate, John Rumbiak, 
pointed out that indigenous communities continue to 
have one of their most basic rights violated by multina-
tional companies: the right to say 'no': "The failure to 
respect communities' basic right to "just say no" exists at 
the heart of the nexus of human rights violations, envi-
ronmental degradation and conflict." [J. Rumbiak, 
Globalisation, Rights and Poverty, 2003.] 
In assessing the Tangguh project's impact on human 
rights, it is crucial to ask whether this 'right to say no' has 
been upheld or violated by BP. Available information on 
BP's consultation with groups affected by the project gives 
no indication that any right to say 'no' is being respected. 
This raises the question: where mega-projects are proposed, 
is the future of indigenous communities and their environ-
ment controlled by the communities themselves or by 
multinational corporations like BP? * 
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Indonesian workers seek jobs abroad 
With a rapidly growing population and an unresolved economic crisis, the export of Indonesian 
workers has become one of the main ways of reducing unemployment. The remittance of money by 
workers to their families has become a major source of Indonesia's foreign exchange earnings but 
this economic benefit hides the intolerable treatment of many workers by their foreign employers. 
NGOs accuse the government off ailing to give the workers proper legal protection. 
There are frequent reports in the Indonesian press about 
workers, mostly women, returning from abroad suffering 
from serious injuries and requiring hospital treatment. The 
number of workers who die while abroad is a further indi-
cation of mal-treatment. The number of unemployed in 
Indonesia is now thought to be 41.2 million while 2.5 
million people enter the labour market each year. Seeking 
jobs abroad looks like being the only way out because of the 
decline in foreign investment and the closure of numerous 
factories . It is estimated that around two million Indonesian 
workers are working abroad at any one time. 
However, there are conflicting views about whether the 
export of workers should continue. A research institute affil-
iated to Nahdatul Ulama called on the government last year 
to terminate the programme because of the plight that has 
befallen hundreds of workers. Speaking for the institute, 
Achain Zaidy said the government should appoint more 
labour attaches and police liaison officers in countries 
where Indonesians are currently employed to protect their 
civil rights. [Jakarta Post, 24 October 2003] However, 
three thousand prospective migrant workers took part in a 
rally in Jakarta, calling on the government to continue to 
allow the recruitment of workers for employment overseas, 
to help cope with the lack of jobs at home. [Jakarta Post, 
18 October 2003] 
Yati, a woman worker who returned from Riyadh, had 
bruises on her back, her feet were battered, her hands 
swollen and her head almost bald. A red spot between her 
eyes was where her employer had hit her with a high-heel 
shoe. She decided to leave Saudi Arabia before the end of 
her 2-year contract and returned home with Rp.1. 7 million 
in cash (US$200) and a cheque for $1,570, her earnings for 
12 months. Another woman, Musriah, broke her back and 
ankle when she jumped from a third-floor window to escape 
from her employer's house. 'I just had to escape. I couldn't 
bear it any more.' After she begged to go home, her 
employer locked her up but she escaped by jumping from 
the window. 
Wiwit had returned from Singapore where she worked 
every day from 5am till midnight. She got two slices of 
bread and half-cooked rice in the morning because she was 
only allowed ten minutes to prepare the meal, and a few 
vegetables for lunch and dinner. She said her employer had 
beaten her for working too slowly and she was weak 
through lack of food and rest. She was promised Rp 1.5 
million (around $180) a month but returned home with only 
$9. She was treated in a psychiatric ward for a mental 
breakdown. [Jakarta Post, 6 December, 2003] 
An official at the Sukanto Police Hospital in East 
Jakarta said they had treated 38 returned workers for seri-
ous injuries in the past two months. Wiwin Marka died in 
the hospital two days after being admitted. Nurmawati, 
an activist for the Consortium for Migrant Workers' 
Protection, said Wiwin, who had also returned from 
Saudi Arabia, was 'skin and bones' when she was admit-
ted into hospital. 'She complained of burning lungs and 
could not eat or drink because she would throw up after-
wards.' Three other returned workers were being treated 
at the hospital for severe bums and digestive problems. 
[Jakarta Post, 17 November 2003] 
'Illegal workers' jailed in Malaysia 
By far the largest number of workers abroad are in 
Malaysia where it is thought that up to one million 
Indonesians are working. Many have entered the country 
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